



# **UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS:**

**Impact of NGOs on Human Rights for Port-au-Prince's Internally Displaced People**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report follows six weeks of research during the summer of 2010. With a team of eight students and a colleague at the Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti, this study covers over 100 camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), a random sample of one in eight of the 861 in the metropolitan area. Students conducted quantitative and qualitative surveys in three inter-related areas: conditions and services within the camps, residents' level of understanding and involvement in the camp committees, and interviews with committee representatives. The author followed up with a visit to 31 camps.

The results show that despite the billions in aid pledged to Haiti, most of the estimated 1.5 million IDPs are living in substandard conditions. For example, seven months following the earthquake, 40 percent of IDP camps do not have access to water, and 30 percent do not have toilets of any kind. An estimated 10 percent of families have a tent; the rest sleep under tarps or even bed sheets. In the midst of the hurricane season with torrential rains and heavy winds a regular occurrence, many tents are ripped beyond repair. Only a fifth of camps have education, health care, or psycho-social facilities on site.

The services provided in the camps vary quite significantly according to a range of factors. Camps in Cité Soleil have almost no services, while those in Pétiion-Ville are better managed. Camps that are not on major roads or far from the city center in Croix-des-Bouquets or Carrefour have little to no services. Smaller camps, with 100 or fewer families, have demonstrably fewer services. Camps situated on private land – 71 percent of the sample – are significantly worse off than those on public land.

Despite the fact that many NGOs empower camp committees to select recipients and distribute aid – most notably food, until the government stopped general distribution in April – most official committees do not involve the population. Less than a third of people living in camps are aware of the strategy or even the name of the committees. Two-thirds of members are men, despite well-documented concerns about gender based violence. While to most NGOs managing camps or offering services these camps represent their “local participation,” it is clear that the present structure leaves much to be desired.

While many committees sprang up organically immediately following the earthquake as an expression of solidarity and unity in an effort for survival, NGOs' relationships with them have several negative intended or unintended consequences. First of all, most NGOs did not inquire about local participation, leadership, needs deliberation, or legitimacy. As a result, in several cases, the NGOs and self-named committees excluded pre-existing grassroots organizations. Some NGOs, the government, and even the land owners themselves created these committees. This is a root of several conflicts. In the majority of cases, the camp committees – who were active in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake – report not doing anything because of lack of funds, testifying to an increasing dependency on foreign aid.

Security – including theft, gender-based violence, and forced evictions from private landowners – remains urgent. The issue of forced eviction is greater than generally acknowledged; of the initial sample, 19 of 106 – or 17 percent of camps – had been closed. Research assistants found an additional fourteen camps that were either closed or under threat of closure. This is a violation of residents' rights as granted by international conventions (the U.N. Guidelines for IDPs). This

issue is likely only to heat up given the election season and the government-imposed deadline of December to close the camps.

These failures are not isolated incidents but symptoms of larger structural problems that require immediate, sustained, profound reflection and attention. Solutions include involving IDP populations in large community meetings, assessing levels democracy and participation within committees, greater NGO accountability, coordination, and submission to a fully-funded local and national government. Housing needs to be recognized as a human right (guaranteed by Article 22 of Haiti's constitution), with concrete, immediate steps to empower people to return to a safe home and basic services (e.g. water, sanitation, health care, and education) made available to all, regardless of residency status. All of these require the immediate release of pledged aid, the vast majority of which has failed to materialize.

Specific policy recommendations include:

- 1. Donors such as the U.S. and U.N. should focus more funds and rebuilding efforts at rebuilding the capacity of the elected Haitian government, and not simply NGOs.**
- 2. All NGOs working in Haiti need to work with the Haitian government and respect the local authorities.**
- 3. All NGOs working in Haiti need to have an active and robust participation of impacted residents. This needs to specifically include regular, general, public, "town hall" meetings in the camps and other impacted communities.**
- 4. NGOs should specifically encourage under-represented populations, particularly women, and pre-existing grassroots groups.**
- 5. NGOs should assess the official committees and support those who are doing well in transitioning toward greater autonomy, offer training to mid-range groups, and engage lower-functioning groups in dialogue with the general population.**
- 6. Provide support for education at all levels, including popular education about IDP rights.**
- 7. Provide more security, particularly for women, including an indefinite end to forced evictions until a sufficient amount of permanent housing is available.**
- 8. Provide services in the neighborhoods as well as the camps.**
- 9. All parties: the Haitian government, NGOs, and donors, need to make the expedient construction of high-quality permanent housing its first priority.**
- 10. Fully fund Haitian relief efforts.**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Acknowledgements .....	1
I.	Introduction .....	2
II.	Background .....	5
III.	Methodology .....	8
IV.	Living Conditions in the Camps .....	10
V.	Patterns in the Gaps in Services .....	18
VI.	Security Issues .....	22
VII.	Camp Committees .....	26
VIII.	Foreign NGOs' Role .....	32
IX.	Recommendations .....	34
X.	Works Cited .....	39
XI.	Appendices .....	41



## LIST OF ACRONYMS

BAI	Bureaux des Avocats Internationaux
CCCM	Cluster for Camp Coordination and Management
CIRH	Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission
DTM	Displaced Tracking Matrix
FRAKKA	Reflection and Action Force on Housing
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Project
IDP	Internally displaced person
KOFAVIV	Commission of Women Victims for Victims
MAST	Ministry of Social Affairs and Work
MINUSTAH	UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti
MPCE	Ministry of Planning and Foreign Cooperation
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OIM	International Organization of Migration
PNH	Haitian National Police
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



Cover photo: One of many ripped tents in Haiti's IDP camps, August 2010. Photos otherwise not attributed are from the author. Previous page and this page: Esaie Jules Gelin. photos of the Solino camp housing 6,820 people, April 2010. Following page and page 4: Corail, July 2010. Corail is very isolated and unprotected from the elements: wind, sun, and rain.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

January 12, 2010 will forever be remembered as one of the world's deadliest disasters. For thirty-five seconds the earth shook and reduced a nation – already struggling with the weight of slavery, underdevelopment, imperialism, and intense internal divisions—to rubble. A conservative estimate of 1.5 million people – one in six people in Haiti – lost their homes, while an estimated 300,000 people lost their lives. The National Palace and the surrounding area – housing most of Haiti's government offices – were almost completely destroyed. In addition to the physical damage suffered, the government lost an estimated 17 percent of its workforce in the temblor.

The world responded with one of the most generous outpourings of aid in recent history. By March 1<sup>st</sup>, private citizens in the U.S. alone – one in two people – donated \$1 billion for the relief effort, of a total of \$2.2 billion in the first two months (Katz 2010a). At a donors' conference on March 31 in New York, international agencies pledged \$5.3 billion over the next eighteen months. This donors' conference also ratified an Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission (CIRH, in the French acronym), with U.N. Special Envoy Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Max Bellerive as co-chairs.

Despite this effort, surprisingly little has reached Haiti's most vulnerable living in the internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. In July, six months following the earthquake, the CNN reported that only 2 percent of the pledged aid had arrived (CNN 2010). Other agencies – including Clinton – have placed the figure at ten percent, but the only funds accounted for are those going through the Haiti Reconstruction Fund, run by the foreign-dominated CIRH.<sup>1</sup> Even with this, very little of the aid is going to the Haitian government. Ac-

ording to the AP, 33 percent of aid went to the U.S. military, while less than 1 percent went to the Haitian government (Edmonds 2010). As of the beginning of April, the U.S. Red Cross collected \$255 million but only allocated \$106 million to Haiti, reserving the majority for administrative and overhead costs (Edmonds 2010).

More than mere embarrassments, these failures constitute violations of the human rights of the 1.5 million people living in the camps (the latest tracking mechanism on September 14 from the International Organization of Migration, OIM in French, actually lists 1.3 million people and an additional 200,000 using the services). The U.N.'s Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) presented Guiding Principles for Internally Displacement in 1998, ratified in 2005 by U.N. member states. It provides some legal framework for IDP rights, including:

- Principle 7: (2) rights to “satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene”
- Principle 11: (2)(a) protection from “rape... gender-specific violence, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault”
- Principle 18: right to an adequate standard of living, including; (a) Essential food and potable water; (b) Basic shelter and housing; (c) Appropriate clothing; and (d) Essential medical services and sanitation

In addition to these Guiding Principles, the Spheres Project ([www.spheres.org](http://www.spheres.org)) coordinated a series of humanitarian actors and established the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards. While self-governed and policed, these are supposedly minimum standards by which all humanitarian agencies are to adhere to following a natural disaster. The first, Common Standard, mandates community participation: “The

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<sup>1</sup> For disbursement figures, consult: <http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf/members>

disaster-affected population actively participates in the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the assistance program.” (For a summary of some pertinent Minimum Standards consult the Appendix – page 41). Other relevant standards are that “all people have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking, and personal and domestic hygiene. Public water points are sufficiently close to households to enable use of the minimum water requirement,” noting the average water use is 15 liters per person per day. Another minimum standard the humanitarian community set for itself is a maximum of 20 people use each toilet.

The legal enforceability of the above remains tenuous, which is why they are referred to as “guidelines” or “minimum standards.” There are, however, more specifically delineated rights, such as the Haitian Constitution 22 that “the State recognizes the right of every citizen to decent housing, education, food, and social security.”<sup>2</sup> In addition to this, the progenitor of all Haitian law, there are numerous international conventions, most of which Haiti has signed onto, such as:

1. *International Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* (1951), Article 21;
2. *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), Article 25;
3. *The Convention on the Rights of the Child* states that all children have the “right to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful influences, abuse and exploitation;”
4. *Charter of the Organization of American States*, Article 31, especially sections (i), (k), and (l);
5. *American Convention on Human Rights*, Articles 22 and 26;
6. *the Right to Adequate Housing* (Article 11 (1) of the International Covenant on

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<sup>2</sup> L’Etat reconnaît le droit de tout citoyen à un logement décent, à l’éducation, à l’alimentation et à la sécurité sociale

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), CECSR<sup>3</sup> General Comment 4, 12 December 1991;

7. *the Right to Water* (article 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), CECSR General Comment 15, 26 November 2002, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:[http://www.who.int/water\\_sanitation\\_health/Documents/righttowater/righttowater.htm](http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/Documents/righttowater/righttowater.htm)

Unfortunately, crowding out this discourse on human rights is another, reactionary refrain used to justify inaction. It is true that, as a result of the uncoordinated, top-down approach to food distribution, cases were documented wherein families sent members to different camps to maximize their chances to get food (INURED 2010). However, nearly all NGO and international agency staff argue that people primarily stay in camps in order to receive services. This narrative has carried weight, cited by members of the U.S. Congress as justification for delay sending the 1.15 billion in pledged aid.

This discussion has lethal consequences, as vital aid is not making its way to the ground. For example, seven months following the earthquake, 40 percent of IDP camps do not have access to water, and 30 percent do not have toilets of any kind. An estimated 10 percent of families have a tent; the rest sleep under tarps or even bed sheets. In the midst of hurricane season with torrential rains and heavy winds a regular occurrence, many of the tents are ripped beyond repair. Only a fifth of camps have education, health care, or psycho-social facilities on site.

Teams of evaluators have completed physical inspections of most of the housing stock in Port-au-Prince, tagging the house in different colors, according to their habitability. “Green houses” – fit for human habitation – have become very valuable; according to U.N. staff, rent for “green

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<sup>3</sup> Haiti is not a signatory to this CECSR.



houses” have gone up 300 percent. This makes “moving back” out of the camps out of reach of most residents, as an estimated 70 to 85 percent of Port-au-Prince residents did not own their home before the earthquake. Most people who thus remain in the camps, enduring the torrential rain and wind as they batter the tents and the resulting pools of mud and standing water that attract disease vectors, do so because they have no option. They are stuck, literally in the mud.

For many other residents still traumatized by losing their families, their worldly possessions, and their homes, the issue is whether or how to move back to homes that have sustained damage. Many are still afraid to sleep under concrete. The question is how to tell whether damaged homes are repairable or whether the foundations are fundamentally unsound. The Public Works teams have color coded these

“yellow” or “red” houses. Also an open question is whether or how homeowners will obtain the resources to rebuild, especially given the lack of funds.

Even a cursory visit to the majority of IDP camps yields the inescapable conclusion that despite the promises and the best efforts of humanitarian actors, much more must be done. Like the thousands who are contemplating moving back into their damaged homes, we need to ask, are people just falling through the cracks, or is the foundation itself unsound?

The evidence systematically collected and analyzed in this report argues the latter. Following the analysis are recommendations to fix the system before it is too late. Prudence – not to mention justice – demands that we not wait til the next disaster to act.



## II. BACKGROUND

Despite a persistent rumor in the immediate aftermath, the temblor can hardly be blamed on collective acts of mankind, unlike two more recent disasters, the oil spill emanating from BP's offshore drill and the monsoons that rendered 20 million Pakistanis homeless, both harbingers of overconsumption of fossil fuels and its attendant increase in global sea temperatures. But the damage done during a more recent earthquake, over five hundred times more powerful, pales in comparison to Haiti.

### Vulnerability

On February 28, an earthquake measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale ripped through Chile, causing hundreds of deaths. While random chance intervened, placing Haiti's earthquake along a newly-discovered fault (Israel 2010) right by Haiti's population center, most of the difference lies in Haiti's heightened vulnerability to disasters.

While it is absolutely true that Chile, like the U.S., has its share of poverty and inequality, Haiti's development indicators are and were much worse than Chile's. For example, Haiti's Gross Domestic Product (GDP, total value of goods and services) per person was \$428 in 2005, while Chile's per capita GDP was \$8,350 in 2007. Half of Haiti's people earn \$1 per day or less, whereas only 2 percent of Chile's citizens live under the "international poverty line" of \$1.25 per day. The latest figures for child mortality are instructive: 74 children out of 1,000 die in Haiti whereas only 9 do in Chile. For all these reasons, Haiti ranked 149<sup>th</sup> out of 182 countries on the U.N.'s Human Development Index (HDI), whereas Chile ranked 44<sup>th</sup>. Haiti is the least developed country in the Americas, while Chile shares a ranking with central Europe. See Oliver-Smith (2010) for further discussion of the construction of Haiti's vulnerability.

For an even clearer example, on September 4, a quake of similar magnitude (7.1) flattened

buildings in Canterbury, New Zealand, with no earthquake-related deaths (Dykstra 2010).

In addition to Haiti's poverty, the earthquake was rendered more deadly because of the rapid and anarchic urbanization since the 1980s. According to Alex Dupuy (2010), Port-au-Prince grew from 150,000 in 1950, to 732,000 in the early 1980s, to approximately 3 million people in 2008. Why did the population of Port-au-Prince increase fivefold since 1980? First, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) demanded that Haitian dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier kill off the entire indigenous pig population following a 1978 outbreak of swine fever (now after recent events known as H1N1). Haitian pigs required relatively little maintenance but could be sold to pay for schooling, medical expenses, and a range of economic goods. They were de-facto bank accounts for the rural population (Diederich 1985), so their genocide represented Haiti's "great stock market crash" (Smith 2001:29). Their livelihood annihilated,<sup>4</sup> many peasants migrated to the cities. Haitian economist and director of research for Haiti's State University (UEH) Fritz Deshommes estimated that neoliberal policies destroyed 800,000 agricultural jobs (Bergan and Schuller 2009). In addition to neoliberalism's "push" factors, it provided several "pull" factors, most notably the siren song of low-wage factory jobs in Haiti's offshore apparel industry. Duvalier boasted that with his collaboration with the World Bank, USAID, and other donors, Haiti would become the "Taiwan of the Caribbean."

So where were newly landless peasants going to live, including those lucky enough to find a job for about \$2 per day in the factories? Port-au-

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<sup>4</sup> There were others, including attempts at reorienting Haiti's peasant economy into global export, consolidating power in large-holding peasants and requiring foreign-produced fertilizers that were maladapted to the Haitian soil and other high inputs like labor and water (DeWind and Kinley 1988).

Prince's *bidonvil*, its shantytowns, were born. Since neoliberal policies, particularly lending institutions' Structural Adjustment Programs, cut what little public spending there was for education and health care, people – particularly women heads of households – had to use their meager earnings to fulfill these basic needs. So people saved money where they could, many living on a seven-by-seven foot patch of land in tomblike structures in neighborhoods where there no government investment in water, street maintenance and cleaning, or electricity. All of these factors – direct outcomes of neoliberal policies – exacerbated Haiti's vulnerability and added to the death toll.

All development indicators have seen a steady decline from 1980 to 2007 except for two. These two indicators – the incidence of HIV/AIDS and literacy – are exceptions precisely because they were mutual priorities of the elected governments of Haiti and donor groups. Since the 1995 Dole Amendment, USAID was prevented from funding the government of Haiti, a manifestation of a divided U.S. government and the U.S. government's mistrust of Haiti's elected governments of Aristide and Préval. However, because it was a priority, USAID was allowed to work with Haiti's government on HIV/AIDS. Haiti's success in combating the disease is a ray of hope: in just over a decade since 1993, the seroprevalence went from 6.2 percent to about 3.2 percent (Cohen 2006).

In short, Haiti's earthquake was rendered more deadly by the implantation and continual application of neoliberalism, the so-called "Washington Consensus" that donor groups like the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and USAID imposed on countries in the Global South like Haiti. The earthquake could have provided an opportunity for rethinking the economic model, with Bill Clinton famously apologizing for the promotion of subsidized Arkansas rice to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 10: "It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. I had to live eve-

ryday with the consequences of the loss of capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people because of what I did; nobody else."

### NGO-ization of the Country

One major plank in neoliberalism is a distrust of states and a preference for private-sector initiatives and the elusive concept of "civil society." Since the 1980s, NGOs have proliferated in Haiti and elsewhere. The 1990s saw a tenfold increase in their numbers, from 6,000 worldwide in 1990 to an estimated 60,000 by 1998 (*Economist*, cited in Regan 2003:3). Currently, there are so many NGOs that we can't even guess at their number (Riddell 2007:53). This rise in the number of NGOs is matched with an increase in funding through them. Globally, in 2005, it is estimated that NGOs channeled anywhere from 3.7 to 7.8 billion U.S. dollars of "humanitarian assistance" (Development Initiatives 2006:47), and 24 billion in overall development funding (Riddell 2007:259).

The pattern is true in Haiti, with only 74 NGOs out of an official count of 343 in 2006 being present before the *dechoukaj*, before the ouster of foreign-supported dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier (Schuller 2007). Since the Dole Amendment in 1995, all of USAID funds go through NGOs. A senior U.N. official recently estimated that for all donors 98 percent of aid goes directly to NGOs. Haitian researcher Sauveur Pierre Étienne called this situation an "Invasion" (1997). All this is to say, whereas NGOs may not have created this neoliberal framework, they accepted an infusion of official government aid – known in the field as "Overseas Development Assistance." Like it or not, the fact that NGOs accepted and continue to seek out more of this aid – and benefit by receiving it in ever-greater amounts – to preside over the development system makes NGOs accountable for its clear failure in Haiti.

Bill Clinton has repeatedly said that there are 10,000 NGOs working in Haiti, which would



Photo: Turgeau, August, 2010. There is much competition between countries and NGOs with little coordination.

make the most NGOs per capita, one for every 900 people. While it is unclear how he arrived at this number, it is likely that he added up the associations and local groups registered with the various ministries. For example 6,000 groups were registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Work (MAST). Student assistants in the summer of 2009 received a copy of this list for a Port-au-Prince neighborhood. Of the 65 groups listed, only 2 still existed. Looking at the timing of the founding of the agencies, and discussing with neighborhood leaders, suggests that they were created to carry out NGO projects. Once the project ended, so did the association.

Whether one adopts the official statistic put out by the Minister of Planning and Foreign Cooperation (MPCE) or Clinton's estimate of 10,000 NGOs, a central issue within the NGO system is coordination. According to MPCE staff, on any given year, only 10-20% of NGOs submit their annual report to the government, despite it being a requirement to function in the country. Since the 1980s through 2009, almost every report commissioned by donors, government of Haiti, NGOs, or independent researchers, on

NGOs concludes with a recommendation that NGOs need to do a better job coordinating with one another, and the government needs to set a framework that NGOs will work under, to avoid duplication of services and gaps and to ensure that local development priorities are being implemented.

The fact that for almost 30 years researchers from across the political spectrum make the same recommendations suggests that NGOs continue to act on their own.

Many in Haiti call NGOs "parallel states" or "states within the state" or simply "fiefdoms" because of their tendency toward isolation and near total control over geographical regions. Further, NGOs directly drain the capacity of the state by paying much higher salaries – many people estimate three times – what World Bank researcher Alice Morton termed "raiding" (1997:25). The social and economic distance that NGOs – the backbone of Haiti's middle class – are expressed in popular distrust of NGOs as a structure. Some, playing on the self-named "political class" are beginning to discuss Haiti's "NGO class" that move from one job to another, driving the newest and biggest cars, etc. (Schuller 2009).

Again, like with the case for neoliberalism and its destruction of the local economy, the earthquake presented an opportunity to rethink the approach to working with NGOs (Kristoff 2010). Clinton even said that it was a mistake to work outside of the Haitian government, creating parallel structures that are unaccountable. "Every time we spend a dollar in Haiti from now on we have to ask ourselves, 'Does this have a long-term return? Are we helping them become more self-sufficient? ... Are we serious about working ourselves out of a job?'"

### III. METHODOLOGY

The methodical approach began with selecting a team of qualified researchers. The author has taught at the Faculté d’Ethnologie since 2004, having a formal affiliation since 2003. Given the economic crisis in the country there are far more qualified applicants than jobs. Over 70 people applied. To minimize political influence or bias the following criteria were selected and applied: having finished with coursework; high overall GPA; not having failed more than one course in the last year or two in the past two; having taken classes in development, NGOs, and methods; and during interviews candidates were asked about candidates’ research and work experience, their references, and their strengths and weaknesses. After interviews the author verified with colleagues, including references students listed. Finally, assistants were sent to the field to conduct a practice survey and write up the results, as the ultimate test of their capacity and initiative. This process was complicated by nearly daily protests at the Faculté d’Ethnologie.

Assistants were trained or had experience conducting research in the field. There were two orientation meetings, and the author met with each individual one-on-one to have a practice and to discuss the issues encountered during practice field research.

#### Sampling

To begin the selection of camps to analyze, the latest OIM’s “Displaced Tracking Matrix” (DTM) spreadsheet was used. On the Cluster for Camp Coordination and Management (CCCM) website, run by OIM, the latest database<sup>5</sup> was dated May 3, with 1282 sites overall and 841 within the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. Every eighth camp was selected for inclusion into this research.

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<sup>5</sup> This May 3 database was the first listing on the website, “list of sites,” as of July 23.

As a purely random sample, it bears significant resemblance to the overall list. Of the overall database, 138 camps were in Port-au-Prince (16%), 206 in Delmas (24%), 148 in Carrefour (18%), 98 in Petionville (12%), 55 in Cité Soleil (6.5%), 97 in Tabarre (12%), and 99 in Croix des Bouquets (12%). Of the sample, 18 were in Port-au-Prince (17%), 25 in Delmas (24%), 18 in Carrefour (17%), 12 in Petionville (11%), 7 in Cité Soleil (6.7%), 12 in Tabarre (11%), and 13 in Croix-des-Bouquets (12%).

In addition to the percentage of communes which would have obviously been similar given that the DTM was organized by commune, the sample is similar in many other aspects to the overall DTM. In terms of the type of camp, 85 are “collective,” 17 are “planned,” 731 are “spontaneous,” and 4 are “transitional.” As of May 3, when the DTM was written, 183 had a camp management agency (22 percent). The largest camp had 16,732 families and the smallest had 10 families, with a mean of 391. Nearly all the camps, 787 (97%) had a committee; 24 did not and 30 camps did not have this information.

Within the sample of 105 camps, 12 are “collective center,” 1 “planned,” 90 “spontaneous,” 1 “transitional,” and 1 did not include this information. 26 have a camp management agency (25 percent). The largest camp had 8500 families and the smallest 15, with a mean of 395 families. 96 of the camps had a committee (96%), 4 did not, and 5 camps did not include this information.

Significantly, several camps were closed by May 3, and many more by July 7, when the DTM was updated. 42 camps were noted as “closed” on the May 3<sup>rd</sup> DTM, with 8 on the random sample. Disturbingly, an additional 19 camps (18%) were closed in the following two months. In order to maintain the scientific verifiability, to make up for the loss of the 27 closed camps, a random sample of the July 7<sup>th</sup> DTM (861) was employed,

one out of every 32 camps. In case of duplication the following camp was used.

## Methods

Assistants went to the field with a three-part survey in their hand, the first investigating the conditions and services, the second asking a sample of four people their level of knowledge and involvement in the committees, and the third interviewing committees (see appendix). Especially during surveys of small camps it was difficult if not impossible to interview four people by themselves, which would have influenced the data. In these cases only two people were selected.<sup>6</sup> In several cases, representatives of the camp committees directed contact between assistants and residents, in some cases answering for the resident. Regarding questions about the camp conditions if the assistant could not physically count the number of tents, for example, (s)he was instructed to obtain this figure from the committee representative. If a good estimate was not possible assistants were instructed to leave this blank.

For quality control purposes, the author had three camps analyzed by two different assistants. In addition, the author followed up with at least one site visit per assistant. In several instances residents themselves invited the author – a foreign researcher – to discuss the situation and document conditions. The author visited 31 IDP camps.

In several cases, the information about location listed on the DTM or on the “Yellow Pages” listing the committee representative and her/his phone number was inaccurate, rendering it difficult and in some cases impossible to find the camp. A total of 113 camps were visited by assistants. Assistants wrote up reports, answering

both the quantitative and qualitative, open-ended questions.

## Analysis

Collaboratively, Chevalier Smail and the author designed an Excel database and trained assistants to enter information. Smail also supervised other individuals to assist in the data entry process, cross-verifying the information assistants entered with the database of the random selection. Because some camps could not be found, their information was not entered into the Excel spreadsheet, so a total of 99 camps were entered. Once the spreadsheet was completed, minor errors were identified and corrected, variables redefined to be able to be used within SPSS. Smail converted the Excel spreadsheet into SPSS. Given the coding and data entry errors, the author corrected the Excel spreadsheet and colleague Tania Levey at York College re-programmed an SPSS file and conducted the simple regression and correlation analyses.

In the data analysis, to explore patterns in the gaps within services and to verify several hypotheses several variables were designated as independent. In addition to the simple frequency, data were cross-tabulated with the following independent variables: land ownership, size of the camp, commune (city), the presence of an NGO camp management agency, and majority of women committee members.

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<sup>6</sup> In one camp, according to the researcher, responses were similar because people didn't want to participate, because this wasn't the first time someone came by and there was never any follow up. Nothing improved in the camp.

#### IV. PHYSICAL CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS

One is immediately struck by the physical conditions inside the camps, particularly following a rainstorm (unfortunately quite a common occurrence in the summer months). Without exception (n = 31) sanitation and drainage for rainwater was a serious issue. On the morning following a rainstorm it is common to find large pools of standing, muddy water – often stretching 20 yards – over which mosquitoes, flies, and other potential disease vectors circle overhead. While miraculously there has not – yet – been a serious outbreak of malaria or cholera, the state of sanitation is manifested in numerous cases of serious skin problems. In at least one camp, Noailles, the researcher estimated that almost all the children had a rash on their bodies because of the heat that is trapped inside the tents combined with the other disease vectors. The author himself contracted a rash following repeated exposure to these unsanitary conditions.



Photo: Coq Michelet Stael. St. Louis de Gonzague, July.

Bracketing the health consequences, this lack of proper drainage and sanitation still represents serious environmental hazards, most notably

the smell. Even in camps with latrines, the standing rainwater and mud is pungent, reminiscent of pig farms. Often, documented by research assistants and the author, the mud seeps underneath people’s tents or tarps, rendering it impossible to sleep or keep personal effects – such as voter ID cards, birth certificates, marriage licenses and memorabilia such as photos – dry and intact. “It is also impossible to sleep when the mud seeps in. Imagine; everything around you moves,” said one resident.

Those whose houses were destroyed or seriously damaged who nonetheless have their *lakou* – the yard – intact, and more than the average economic resources or other means stay in tents elevated from the ground by cinder blocks recovered from the houses. But these sleeping berths are the distinct minority.

#### Sanitation

People staying at or near their houses and not inside one of the eight hundred camps within the capital do not have to contend with the problems associated with sharing a bathroom with neighbors. At even the best managed camps, this is a widespread concern. The Sphere minimum standards – recently translated into Haitian Creole<sup>7</sup> – outline two ways to address this sharing: facilities are either sex-segregated or shared by household. The author only encountered two camps with sex-segregated toilets, and

these were both very large camps, planned re-settlements. The lack of gender-segregated fa-

<sup>7</sup> [http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com\\_doman/task,doc\\_details/Itemid,203/gid,406/lang,english/](http://www.sphereproject.org/component/option,com_doman/task,doc_details/Itemid,203/gid,406/lang,english/)

ilities poses serious problems, particularly for women.

Carine Exantus, a FASCH (Social Sciences) college student and author of a blog reporting from the camp in Champs-de-Mars across the National Palace,<sup>8</sup> recalled in an interview,

In my camp, there are 12 toilets in the front, 12 toilets in the back for 4,200 people. When I wake up very early, I have a friend who lives right near here, and in the early mornings I can go to her house and she lets me use her shower. But in the camp, the shower is... everyone at their tent has a little plastic basin, where they throw water over themselves, or they just shower in public. They put water in their *basin* and they bathe like that, there are many young men and women who do it that way. In my journal I wrote about this; young women suffer sexual aggression because they have to take showers in public.<sup>9</sup>

The Minimum Standards are also clear about how many people should share a toilet: no more than 20. It is clear from Carine's testimony that these conditions are not even being met right in front of the National Palace, where foreign NGOs, dignitaries such as former U.S. presidents, and journalists visit. The toilets line the outside of the camp, presenting the appearance of plenty. Hidden from passersby's view are rows and rows of tarps and tents.

And this is in a camp that is relatively well taken care of. Away from the glaring gaze of foreigners there are camps that are far worse off. In Place de la Paix (Peace Plaza), in the Delmas 2 neighborhood, also lining the perimeter, there was a row of toilets next to the trash recep-

tacles, which was next to the water distribution and the site for the mobile clinic. Strikingly, there were only 30 toilets for 30,400 people. In a small camp in Carrefour, to go to the bathroom people have to ask a neighbor whose house is still standing. Camp leader Carline explains, "It's embarrassing. And even though they are neighbors, it's starting to strain our relationship." They have to buy water and carry it back into the camp.

According to the latest DTM, 6,820 people live in the soccer field outside of the rectory in Solino. Despite this density, residents had to wait for almost five months for the first toilets to arrive. When asked how people defecate, a resident held up a small plastic bag usually used to sell half cups of sugar, or penny candy. "We throw it in the ravine across the street." In the CAJIT camp, housing almost 2500 people in a far-off neighborhood in Carrefour, there were no toilets – either portable or latrines – at least as of August 12, seven months following the earthquake.

These cases are unfortunately not isolated. According to even the most conservative estimates, with some large camps in which assistants had to estimate taken out of the sample, the average number of people sharing a toilet in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area is 273 people. Thirty percent (27 out of 89) of camps with verified information did not have any toilets at all. Another investigation from LAMP, IJDH, LERN, and the University of San Francisco Law School found similar results, that 27 percent of families had to defecate in a plastic container or an open area (The LAMP for Haiti Foundation, et al. 2010). This data was seven months following the earthquake, despite the persistent narrative that people are swelling the camps – or 'faking it,' just using the camps during the daytime – primarily in search of services.

For the camps with services, the most common are latrines, pit toilets with a hole dug in the ground (35, or 62.5 percent), followed by plastic portable toilets (19, or 34.0%). In a small minor-

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.conversationsforabetterworld.com/author/Carine%20Exantus/>

<sup>9</sup> Interview with author and Beverly Bell, July 2010. Transcribed and translated by Laura Wagner.



ity of camps (2, or 3.6%), residents had access to flush toilets. Installing toilets is one of the most important service provided by NGOs. Unfortunately residents' needs don't stop with their installation, and many are not cleaned on a regular basis. While 25 camps report that their toilets are cleaned every day (37 percent – mostly those with portable toilets), 10 camps (15%) report that they are cleaned less often than once per month, and 17 (25%) report not having the toilets cleaned at all. "They treat us like animals!" said an exasperated resident. She was interrupted by a neighbor: "worse! Animals live better than us." Some members of the WASH (Water and Sanitation) cluster are frustrated at what they see as the irresponsibility of NGOs: "We call and call and write report after report. Some just flatly ignore us."

## Water

In addition to sanitation, arguably even more important, is the provision of safe, clean, water. In several reports the UN highlights the distribution of water to 1.2 million people (Ban 2010) as a success of the ensemble of agencies and NGOs. Like sanitation, there are still – as of seven months following the earthquake – large gaps in water distribution to IDP camps.

Take for example the case of Bobin, in a ravine outside of Pétion-ville, in a popular neighborhood off of Route des Frères. As of seven months following the earthquake, the 2775 residents (according to the DTM, there were 1591 people) still had no water. A single PVC pipe that had cracked offers some people a couple of buckets whenever the government turns on the tap for paying clients. Many people use the rainwater in the trash-filled ravine. Some individuals had the opportunity to fetch water from a nearby tap, either privately owned or at a nearby camp. Residents mentioned that NGOs had talked about installing a water system but



Photo: unnamed camp, Delmas, August, 2010. Fortunately this camp has water, unlike 40 percent that do not.

seven months after the earthquake, it still had yet to materialize. According to Valerie Kausen who investigated the situation, most of the problem lies in the fact that two NGOs, Solidarité and World Vision International, had begun to work in the camp at the same time, so each assumed the other would finish the project. World Vision got out. Despite this, the OIM Camp Management Officer (CMO, the official representative and responsible party for the city) in Pétion-Ville, referred Dr. Kausen to World Vision as the Camp Management Agency. Months later, at the end of September, following advocacy from Kausen and the report author, progress was finally made in Bobin.

Several other camps, particularly in Cité Soleil and CAJIT in the hills above Carrefour noted above, were without water as the research team investigated. Said Olga Ulysse, CAJIT leader, "Carrefour is blessed with many little springs. But the problem is that they are running under the destroyed houses and the decomposing bodies. It's very unhealthy, yes. But we don't have any choice at all." The other choice is to walk downhill to the adjacent camp, pay for a bucket of water, and carry it back up the hill.

Of the camps wherein assistants could obtain reliable information, 30 out of 71, or 40.5 percent, of camps did not have a water supply, and 3 others (4.1 percent) had a nearby PVC pipe that was tapped outside the camp. The human rights investigation cited above (LAMP et. al. 2010) noted similar results, that 44 percent of families drank untreated water. With the notable exception of the WASH cluster who distinguishes themselves by being the only one led by the Haitian government, accountable to the people and not the NGOs and characterized by an activist, hands-on approach to filling the gaps in services, people from all levels of the aid industry repeated the refrain that providing life-saving necessities encourages dependency. Said one NGO worker, “people are only living in the camps in order to get the free services.” This discourse has wide currency in aid circles and foreign parliaments, including U.S. Congress. In addition to this issue, several commentators pointed to the issue of profit-making. According to a person who works at a foreign development agency, private water company owners persuaded Préval to stop free water distribution because it was cutting into their profits (personal communication with foreign development evaluator, July 2010).

Several other minimum standards are not being met regarding water provision. According to the Sphere Project, the average person’s water intake is 15 liters per day. Even given the publicly available information (NGOs’ self reporting), more needs to be done to attain this goal (interview with WASH cluster, August 2010). Given the constraints on the methodology of this research, relying on residents’ knowledge of the quantity of water, and quality (maximum levels of bacteria and other toxins in the water) more specific

information is not possible. According to residents’ reporting, two thirds of the water distributed is treated. A minimum standard that appears to be attained is that the nearest source needs to be no farther than 500 meters away. There are only a few camps wherein this distance is even possible, and those that are large enough are planned resettlement sites wherein NGOs and the OIM followed protocol.

### Health Care

Given the very poor state of the health care sector before the earthquake, this sector overall has improved following the efforts of donors and NGOs coordinating with the Haitian government. Ground was recently broken on a new, large capacity teaching hospital in Mirebalais in partnership with Partners in Health / Zanmi Lasante and the Haitian government, approved by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund in their second meeting in August (Charles 2010). Within the flurry of news coverage marking the six month point, Clinton and others claimed success because of the lack of outbreaks of public health catastrophes which oth-



Photo: Caradeux camp, July 2010. Despite the initial investment and appearance of health care facilities, they have been neglected according to residents.

erwise would be expected given the state of sanitation within the camps, notably malaria and cholera. Clinton and others pointed to the existence of mobile clinics and other vaccination programs to explain this success, without citing epidemiological research.

Indeed, there are several gaps within the coverage of health care facilities inside the IDP camps. Only one camp in five has any sort of clinic facility on-site. This number does not account for quality. For example, in one camp, Carradeux, a tent was provided by UNICEF that resembles a clinic, but it was completely empty: no medicines, no first aid supplies, and no nurse practitioners were present on researchers' five visits to this camp. "I'm a nurse," executive committee member Elvire Constant began. "But we don't have the means to serve the population. I spoke on TV and radio, telling the minister of public health that there are nurses available, and the population is vast [24,161, according to the latest information]. ... UNICEF knows the tent is here, but they have never come by, not even one day, to negotiate with us, to tell us whether it could be a mobile clinic or a health center." Inside the camp a couple hundred meters, a tent from Save the Children whose purpose eluded everyone I asked was empty and ripped past the point of providing any shelter. Carradeux is an officially-managed, planned relocation site, and supposed to therefore be an example for others. Indeed, the researcher who visited the camp gave this camp a 3 out of 10 as far as overall quality, with 1 being acceptable and 10 being the worst imaginable. Most other camps were given higher scores, meaning the conditions were worse.

According to residents, the median walking distance to the nearest clinic was 20 minutes, with the mean being 27 minutes. Five camps are so isolated that residents told researchers that it takes 90 minutes to reach the nearest clinic. The same can be said of pharmacies. While in the earthquake's immediate aftermath medications were given to residents free of charge, this practice stopped early on in most camps and



Photo: Carradeux, July. Flooding often occurs when it rains, also causing standing water.

neighborhoods. Nine out of 85 responses, ten percent, of camps had some form of a pharmacy on-site. The mean time to walk to the nearest pharmacy was 25 minutes, with the farthest being two hours.

## Education

Education – under duress even before January 12 – remains in crisis, particularly for people living within the camps. Students were without schools for three months, as the government gave a deadline of April 5, the day after Easter, for schools to reopen. Despite this, up to 40% of schools could not re-open because of the extent of the damage to physical buildings and the deaths of school personnel (interview with government official, July 2010).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> The September 2010 UN Secretary General's report outlines 80 percent of schools had re-opened in Port-au-Prince.



Photos: Esaie Jules Gelin. Solino, April 2010. Children exposed to hazardous conditions in the camps because they do not have access to school.

Even for schools that re-opened, many children do not have access to attend. In Haiti, even before the earthquake, schools were among families' highest expense. Career popular educator and activist Reyneld Sanon estimated that, "in a good school, you can pay up to 20,000-25,000 Haitian gourdes (\$500-625) per year per child." For schools of questionable quality, known as *lekòl bòlèt* (literally, "lottery school," in other words, take your chances), tuition and fees for one child amounted to a third of Haiti's minimum wage of 70 gourdes (\$1.75) per day.<sup>11</sup> For those living in camps this problem was exacerbated. On top of this issue of funds in a devastated economy, people living in camps have the additional concern of the farther transport. One

<sup>11</sup> After objecting to Parliament's unanimous bill raising Haiti's minimum wage to 200 gourdes (\$5) per day in the summer of 2009, President Préval suggested 125 gourdes (\$3.12).

resident, a mother of three school-aged children, told that she didn't send her children to schools because of the time and the expense in sending them to school: "It is three *kous* (routes) to get to school – 25 goud per person – and an hour and a half each way if there is traffic." In the Corail camp, in the desert difficulties of transport are even worse. Corail is four *kous* to town, and at least an hour and a half with good traffic on public transport.

For all these reasons, building schools within the camps is a necessity if the 600,000 children living in camps are to have an education. "It is a crisis. We are setting ourselves up to lose a generation," said a camp committee leader in Carrefour. Despite this, according to UN staff, the government issued a decree forbidding schools from being built within the camps (interview with author, August 2010). In addition to the very powerful refrain that providing services within camps would encourage people to stay in the camps indefinitely and hinder progress in rebuilding people's houses, this person's analysis was quite blunt: "In Haiti, schools are the most profitable industry." While statistics are not available to verify the claim, the point is clear.



Photo: Public school, Routes des Frères, August 2010. Official statistics say 80% of schools have been reopened. OIM officials pressured residents from leaving the grounds.

As is the effect. Only 21 camps (21 percent) had a school as part of its services. Said Samuel Rémy, one of 6,000 people displaced from the

Saint Louis de Gonzague school around the April 5<sup>th</sup> deadline, “There are 3,000 children here. Don’t we *pèp la* (“the people,” poor majority) have a right to school as well?” Education is a right guaranteed by Article 32.1 in Haiti’s constitution. As the new school year approaches, IDPs have made education for their children a focus of mobilization, for example on Monday, September 13.

### Condition of the Tents

While many foreign policymakers suggest that Haiti’s poor majority are living better than they have before the earthquake, they are forgetting the simple reality that living under tents or tarps do not provide adequate shelter against the harsh Caribbean conditions of extremely hot sun, winds, and tropical rains. In some camps, half of the tents were ripped beyond repair because of the winds. Elvire Constant recalled, “the wind is crazy. Last night [early August] the wind blew for more than three hours straight. I woke up, got up on my knees and held the tent up, left and right so that the tent wouldn’t blow away with me. What’s more serious is the afternoon sun.” Elvire had to leave her tent because it was destroyed. She pointed to another, where we were standing



Photo: Caradeux, July 2010. This tent that the wind ripped was only installed ten days prior, the person’s second.

right by the entrance to the camp, just recently shredded by that night’s winds. The tent was on the ground not more than ten days. In all the camps visited, at least the bottom portion of the tents were covered in mud. In at least one camp, Obama3, the majority of tents were ripped as of early August.

These are the people who have tents. Most people in the camps don’t even have a tent. Assistants estimated that only ten percent of families living in the camps have a tent. Human rights investigators noted that of the 58 families studied in six camps, 78 percent did not live in an enclosed area (LAMP et al., 2010). For example, in Delmas 2, in Place de la Paix (Peace Plaza), the vast majority slept under tarps, that were set up in a patchwork fashion to cover the plaza. Rare was an individual tent underneath this “roof” that still leaked when it rained. Berthe Israel, president of a twenty-year old association called Men Nan Men (Hand in Hand), said, “The tents we have are minimal. There’s probably 10 tents inside [for 6901 families per the DTM]. I don’t believe there are 50, at most. You can see for yourself. [The author did.] The vast majority is under tarps. I wonder, what if there’s a fire? The entire camp would go up in flames. How can these people save the 2-3 things they have?”

This is not merely an academic concern. The hurricane season is upon us; two years ago this month 793 people lost their lives following four tropical storms. The conditions are ripe for an even greater catastrophe given people’s housing situation. Luck and hope is not good social policy for avoiding disaster.

Case in point: a storm on Friday, September 24 that was not connected to a tropical storm killed five and injured 50 (Delva 2010).

On the six-month anniversary, when the government was handing out medals to foreigners,



Photo: July 2010. Tents destroyed at Corail, a week before rains destroyed hundreds of tents.

hundreds of tents were ripped in Corail following a light rain.

The core emergency disaster preparedness plan promoted by the UN and touted as a success by

several media stories involves texting messages to community leaders' cell phones. Unfortunately without access to electricity many people's cell phones are habitually not working. In 50 out of 94 valid responses, camps have a place to charge cell phones, but this service is not free. That this service is even available at all is an outcome of people's initiative to install a wire to an existing one. Some random individuals have their own plug. Often as a result, people's cell phones are no longer in service. According to research assistants who attempted to contact camp committee representatives listed on the OIM's "Yellow Pages," around 80 percent of the residents' phones were invalid. The likely reason is this issue of money to charge the phone.

Added up together, the camp conditions are far inadequate, subhuman, and violations of human rights. We must do better.




Photo: Place de la Paix, Delmas 2, July 2010. There is only a patchwork of tarps covering the camp. Note the sunlight coming through, where rain seeps in.



Photo: Soeurs Salessiens, August 2010. In several camps, the majority of tents are ripped beyond repair seven months following the earthquake.

## V. PATTERNS IN THE GAPS IN SERVICES

Seen from above, in terms of abstracted statistics of numbers of people served – 4.3 million people were given food, 2.1 million people non-food items, and 1.2 million receive water on regular basis (UN Security General’s Report, September 1) – it appears that progress is being made.

Seen from below, from the residents, the situation looks quite different. For example, 173 people said that aid arrived – out of 324 people (53.4%), with 7 people reporting that they did not know. Put another way, four out of nine people (44.4%) said that no aid arrived whatsoever, in any form. The LERN / IJDH / LAMP / U of San Francisco human rights investigation reported that 75 percent of families had a person who did not eat an entire day in the previous week. This was in July (LERN et al., 2010).

Of the aid that arrived, almost half (46.5%) stopped distribution in or before April – 3-4 months since the interviews – and more than a third (35.1%) stopped in or before March – 4-5 months in the past. That said, 31.7 percent of the aid – which includes water, food, first aid kits, tents, etc.<sup>12</sup> – was last distributed in July.

However if we are to improve the situation for the 1.3 million residents of the camps, we need to ask, are there patterns in terms of who is *not* being served, and why? Some camps are far better managed and served than others. There are patterns within the gaps in service that need to be addressed. In addition to the simple statistics listed above, correlations in the data were explored with a range of variables. Analysis of the data using SPSS yielded four statistically significant differences in services: the presence of NGO camp management agencies, the municipality, the size of the camp, and ownership of the land on which the camps sit.

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<sup>12</sup> The use of the term “aid” varies from person to person. For example, some consider water to be aid while some do not, reserving the term for food distribution only.

### NGO Camp Managers

This is the most obvious difference, and thankfully so. Data shows that camps with NGO managers are far better serviced than camps without managers. This is as it should be; the primary role of camp managers is to assure and supervise service delivery. That said, as of the July 7 DTM database, only 20.8 percent of camps (171 of 822 listed in the metropolitan area) had an NGO management agency. NGO-managed camps are more represented in the random sample in this study, 33 percent.

For example, while the overall percentage of camps with water provided was 57.7%, the percentage is much higher (88.5%) in camps with an NGO management agency than those without (40%). The same is true of health care; whereas one in five camps overall had an onsite clinic, NGO-managed camps had twice that number (37.5%) while non-managed camps had half (11.1%). In overall conditions, on a scale from 1 to 10, with one being best, assistants assigned a mean of 5.1 for NGO managed camps and 6.4 for non-NGO managed camps. This isn’t perfect, as one of the worst (10) managed camps, Place de la Paix in Delmas 2 noted above, has an NGO camp management agency.

While there is indeed some hope in this finding – that NGO management agencies appear to make a difference in services provided to the residents – the question must be asked as to why the vast majority of camps – four in five – do not have a management agency. OIM staff said that despite the information diligently collected about services or lack thereof, they have no mechanism to force NGOs to become camp management agencies. “It’s a thankless job,” said one. That said, there is clearly much more work to be done, particularly in areas typically underserved by NGOs. An NGO that is among the most visible and hard-working in Cité Soleil bristled at being listed as camp manager for fear of the communication of public responsibil-

ity that this designation connoted. “Others are just plain lazy,” said a development agency official on condition of anonymity.

## Municipality

*“Maybe it’s because we’re hidden away inside that the NGOs have forgotten us, but we’re the area that is most affected! This area, Fort-National and Pivoine, doesn’t have a big road so the NGO trucks just don’t see us. Maybe they just don’t see us.”* – “Ti Georges,” camp committee leader in Pivoine

There are definitely geographical differences in the services offered. For example, the percentage of camps with water is greater in the central cities of Delmas, Port-au-Prince, and Pétion-Ville, where the NGOs and the UN are headquartered. 83 percent of the camps in Delmas had water, whereas only 29 percent of camps in Croix-des-Bouquets and 25 percent in Carrefour had water.<sup>13</sup> It is possible that Carrefour residents have better access to CAMEP, the public water facilities or the sources. But it is consistent with the other findings. Simply put, Carrefour is farther away, with many camps off the main highway. Camps in Carrefour are also less likely (10.5%) to have a children’s play space than average (18.8%), to say the least about Pétion-Ville (33.3%).

The first words from Olga Ulysse, leader within the CAJIT camp in Carrefour and *Madanm Sara* (international commercial importer) whose business was totally destroyed with her house, were gratitude that we even showed up: “People make appointments and they don’t come. I don’t know if it’s too far or if people are afraid of the mountain.” Her colleague Madame Odrigue, who is an elected member of the community council, the official local government, had another theory: “It’s because the

<sup>13</sup> Regrettably the assistant who primarily worked in Cité Soleil was not present when each camp was discussed (given the questionnaire there was an issue of coding), there were only two valid responses. But consistently Cité Soleil is far below average on every other indicator.

donors don’t get credit for giving us water, unlike down the hill next to the Route National.”

This geographical difference in services is most noticeable in Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince’s largest and poorest shantytown. None of the camps in Cité Soleil had a school, a canteen, a children’s recreational center, or a space that adults can use for committee meetings or other programming. Cité Soleil is far underserved because NGOs are afraid to, or don’t want to, work there. WASH and the IOM have a close collaboration in Cité Soleil, “but we can’t do more than push. The NGOs would rather work in the less badly hit, wealthier suburb of Pétion-Ville (also close to their offices) rather than where the greatest need is,” decried the Cité Soleil IOM officer, who correctly predicted that this data would show a much lower rate of coverage in his area. Cité Soleil and other shantytowns subsumed under larger communes such as Carrefour Feuilles and Delmas 2 were declared “Red Zones” in the violent period following Aristide’s forced ouster in 2004.<sup>14</sup>

The situation of duplication in Bobin, which in the end meant that both NGOs dropped it, would never have occurred in Cité Soleil. “I can barely get the NGOs to come visit Cité Soleil, Delmas 2, Bel-Air, etc. Some say that they can’t. Some say that their car rental insurance won’t cover it. Some say they are legally prevented. In any case, these are the areas of greatest need.” Feast or famine, the problem is the same: lack of NGO coordination and the Haitian government’s inability to mandate coverage.

As, of course, is the result.

<sup>14</sup> While it is true that many of these areas have been sites of violence, they are not more so than others not so designated. They were, however, the focus of clashes between U.N. troops and local armed groups. According to many, this designation is a reflection of the distrust of the poor majority and an attempt to dismantle Haiti’s organized poor in these areas, known as hotbeds of Aristide support.



## Size of the Camps

Size matters in the camps, a combination of this issue of NGO visibility and the refrain that people are only staying in camps to get services, and therefore cutting services will spur people on to rebuild their homes. Smaller camps – those with 100 or fewer families – receive far less services than larger ones. OIM and other humanitarian agencies began talking about a phenomenon of “ghost” (shrinking and disappearing) camps, particularly since April, after the general food distribution stopped. One humanitarian was quite direct: “places with fewer than 200 families aren’t camps. We need to stop calling them camps and treating them like camps.” Another was even more direct, according to International Action Ties, saying that, “if the camp doesn’t have more than 150 people, it doesn’t exist according to IOM.”



Photo: Carrefour, Route des Rails, July 2010. Most camps like this right on the street are not officially recognized.

For example, camps with more than 1,000 families were more likely to have water (67%) than the overall average, whereas camps with 100 or fewer families were far less likely to have water – only 30%. The percentage of small (100 or fewer families) camps that had a clinic onsite was far smaller (6.3%) than average (19%), and

certainly than large (more than 1,000 families) camps (58%). In addition, small-to-medium camps (up to 200 families) were also underserved: none in the sample had a clinic. Small camps were also less likely to have a children’s play space (6.3, compared to 18% average), and large camps were also much more likely to have psycho-social centers (58 percent, compared to an average of 16%).

People’s top priority – especially people having to keep all their belongings in a tent that can rip or be ripped, offering only the most minimal protection from the hot Caribbean sun and the tropical rain storms that have been battering the island – is to be moved into their old house, or a permanent house. That’s why people choose to stay in a small, “spontaneous” shelter close by their old home, where their social ties, friends, families, churches, school, business, street commerce, etc. remain. One donor representative was quite blunt: “if we keep giving them services people will never move back into their homes.” So these very people in the small camps trying desperately to do just that are in a second tier of camps that don’t offer any services. One committee leader, Carline Cherline, decried that the only time they got help was from a private citizen, who happened to have two tents to give. “After that, nothing at all. No one has come to offer aid.” The other ten shelters crowding the *lakou* (yard) of a private home, people had to buy. As if predicting a concern from visiting officials, “they should come by at night and see how many people are sleeping here. During the day, people are out in the market, out at school, out trying to make a living.” This policy of shutting down smaller camps is also impractical, as many large camps, particularly official re-settlement sites like Co-rail or Tabarre Issa, won’t accept new residents. As many people asked, “where are we going to go?”

## Land Owner

Among other things, the earthquake destroyed walls that protected private property, such as the Pétion-ville Club – a private golf club that became home to 30,100 people as of July. Desperately seeking shelter, this poses a fundamental conflict of interest: landowners' right to their property and residents' rights to decent temporary shelter and living conditions. Again on the belief that people are living in the camps because of the services provided, some private owners have cut off life-saving services, to get people to willingly leave the camps. NGOs and the UN "cannot interfere when the owner does not want us there," said an official.

The result is that camps on public land have more services than those on private land. Camps that are on government land are more likely to have water (75%) than those on private land (51.8%).<sup>15</sup> The differences in health provision are more dramatic; 39 percent of camps on state land had a clinic, whereas only 12 percent of camps on private land did. Camps on public land were almost twice as likely to have a school (32%, compared to 17%). Among other issues there is also a significant difference regarding spaces for children to play (12 percent on private land, 27 percent on state land).

For example, the administration of the Saint-Louis de Gonzague school refused NGOs access to provide services. They stopped food distribution after the first time, and refused water. In March, there was only group of four toilets in the camp, for almost 12,000 people. Camp leader Elvire Constant who lived there at the time recalled, "Doctors Without Borders was supposed to return to build more toilets, but that's been suspended. They even stopped a mobile clinic! I was forced to go uphill look for the Americans to build a mobile clinic here. But the priest told the Americans to not pile up the grounds! He said there were too many tents in

the compound, that the space was saturated." Because Saint-Louis is in the centrally located, densely-NGO-populated Delmas, residents did have the opportunity to walk to a nearby camp for some – but not all – of the necessary services.

Samuel Rémy, with a group called Comité d'Action pour le camp de St. Louis (CAS), argued that this withholding was an attempt to starve people out. "They know that we need food, clean water, latrines, and other materials. But we here have no choice but to stay here so we find what we need outside." According to several neighborhood leaders, including Jean-Manno Paul with Regroupement des Victims de 12 Janvier (Network of Victims of January 12), the school director kept the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières from providing services. One day we visited, a group of Cuban doctors sat sheepishly in the entrance, waiting for authorization.

Eventually half of the residents of Saint-Louis de Gonzague were moved to Carradeux, including Elvire, in April. But this situation of starving people out of services is far from unique: International Action Ties has documented at least five other locations where this same situation occurred (2010a).

This forced eviction is also one of several security issues faced by people living in the camps.

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<sup>15</sup> The data set was too small to be statistically significant for camps on schools or churches for analysis.

## VI. SECURITY ISSUES

Given the persistence of the discourse of people “living better” than they had before the earthquake given the increased foreign presence and provision of services, one might easily forget that tents offer no protection against insecurity. Said a 23-year old woman who preferred to remain anonymous for security reasons, “A nail file or a razor can rip my tent. That’s why I can’t leave, or if I do, I have to carry my money and [legal] papers with me.”

### Gender-Based Violence

As Carine’s testimony about having to bathe in public powerfully demonstrates, women living in the camps are at risk of unwanted advances, rape, and sexual violence. Women’s organization KOFVIV (Commission of Women Victims for Victims) reported 230 incidences of rape in 15 camps (Bell 2010b). Médecins Sans Frontières reported 68 cases of rape in one of their clinics in April (Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, et al. 2010). A study authored by five agencies based on two delegations including lawyers and women’s health experts concluded that the reasons for this rise in rape are many: overcrowding, lack of privacy, lack of preventative measures, and inadequate response from government and the UN.

Grassroots women’s organizations like FAVILEK and KOFVIV have been courageously responding to this rise in violence, documenting, accompanying survivors to assure adequate police and medical response, organizing night vigils, and organizing women to denounce the limited response. Unfortunately many of these activists are becoming targets themselves. Said KOFVIV’s Malya Villard:

I decided to leave the camp because I was a victim of violence, where a prison escapee pulled a gun on me, pressuring me. He told me that the police is behind him, he uses the police’s firearms, that he killed a lot of people, raped a lot of

women, and kidnapped many people. That’s what he does to live. ... This camp has a lot of people who escaped from prison living inside [according to official statistics, 5,409 had escaped]. He said that he wasn’t alone; he had a team of some 50 people. So, I was forced to leave the camp because of this.

This followed the attempted rape of a child of Eramithe Delva, another leader within KOFVIV: “A young man tried to rape a child of ours here. When we went to the police station right here, they didn’t even come and they never even conducted an investigation. I explained that the guy returned under the tent and had a weapon in his hand. A police officer said, ‘I can’t say anything. That’s Préval’s problem. Préval has to get involved.’”

When asked if the police conduct patrols, several camp residents said the same thing; that while it may be true that police patrol the perimeter of the largest and highest visibility camps such as the one in Champs-de-Mars, they rarely, if ever, go inside the camps. According to an August study by the U.S. Institute for Peace, 75 percent of IDPs report not having ever seen any police – either PNH (Haitian National Police) or MINUSTAH (UN Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti). According to KOFVIV, only 6 camps out of the 1300 have regular police patrols.

### One Solution: Permanent Housing

While it is not a panacea, permanent housing is one clear solution to stemming the tide of rape. As Eramithe Delva, one of KOFVIV’s leaders, argues, “I think that if someone had a house to stay in, she is in more security. Now, people are sleeping under plastic. All it takes is someone to come by with a razor and rip the tent, and he can come inside and do what he wants. It’s like you’re sleeping in the street if you’re in a tent.” Even the so-called “T-shelters” (temporary shel-

ters) are made of the same material that is easy to rip. Despite this, very little progress has been made in clearing the rubble and rebuilding permanent housing to date. A September 11 AP article cited that 2 percent of the rubble has been cleared.

Of the Minister of Public Works' survey of 230,000 buildings, half (50.2%) were declared "green," or structurally sound, 27.3% declared "yellow," in need repair, and 22.4 % were "red" or recommended for demolition (Ban 2010). Funds have not been allocated to homeowners to clear and repair their housing. According to neighbors, it costs up to 20,000 U.S. dollars to demolish and clear a house. Neither the Haitian government nor donors and NGOs are offering assistance or subsidies to homeowners. Given that the earthquake destroyed many people's livelihoods, only the privileged few are able to invest in home repair. Even solidly middle-class people such as all but two families in the neighborhood of Christ-Roi have abandoned their homes.

Another roadblock cited by government and international agencies is the issue of land tenure. An estimated 70-85 percent of Port-au-Prince residents did not own their home before the earthquake.<sup>16</sup> While the country has eminent domain laws (8th of July 1921 Decree on the Recognition of Public Interest)<sup>17</sup> the Préval government is loathe to use it. Haiti's first coup d'état against liberator Jean-Jacques Dessalines was triggered by his decision to appropriate lands of the *ancien libre* – people who owned land before the Haitian Revolution. The issue of land tenure is also behind another security crisis for Haiti's 1.3 million IDPs (Padgett and Desvarieux 2010).

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<sup>16</sup> See also IAT, "We Became Garbage to Them"

<sup>17</sup> At a July 2010 Bureaux des Avocats Internationaux (BAI, international lawyers' office) press conference, Mario Joseph argued, "the state has the right to declare private property for social and housing purposes under the 8th of July 1921 Decree on the Recognition of Public Interest."



Photo: Soeurs Salessiens, August, 2010. School officials pressured residents to leave. Those who remained have nowhere else to go.

### Forced Eviction

Most IDPs face another form of insecurity, the threat of forced eviction – or "expulsion." Of the sample, 71.9 percent of the camps are on private land, with the bulk of the remainder on state land (24.0%). This compares to an official statistic from the OIM's June 25 Registration Update, cited in an IAT report, that 60 percent of camps are situated on private land (2010b:3).<sup>18</sup> The July human rights investigation reported that 48% of the 58 families that they were able to contact (many had moved to another camp already) had been threatened with forced eviction (LAMP et al., 2010). A woman's organization leader at a public school in Route Frères also said that OIM came to tell residents that the camp was closing, in August when school was not in session.

Again because of the belief that people are living in camps because of the services provided, there is a pattern of landowners attempting to force people off by stopping the delivery of life-giving services like water, food, healthcare, and sanitation. In too many cases, when this does not work, violence is used as a last recourse.

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<sup>18</sup> Schools and churches comprise the rest.

Advocacy group International Action Ties has followed several such cases, the subject of a report (2010a), as have Haitian advocacy groups FRAKKA and BAI, the subject of several campaigns.

According to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon's September 1 report (2010), 29 percent of the 1268 camps had been closed because of forced evictions or negotiated departures. Advocates and others following the situation on the ground have been noticing this issue for quite some time. For example, 27 percent of the sample was closed by July 7. Researchers identified an additional seven camps that had been closed and an additional eight that were in immediate threat of closure.

This figure is not counting instances like at St. Louis de Gonzague, noted above, or the Pétiön-Ville Club where some (or most) residents were forced out but the camp itself remains. Elvire and 6,000 others were forced out in early April.

One case of forced eviction occurred at the Soeurs Salessiens school in Carrefour. Agents acting as security for the school have been pressuring people out. According to the OIM database 5169 families lived in the camp. But school officials have designs to close the camp. Said community leader Mura St. Badette, "from time to time you hear some pressure that they're going to force us out. And recently they just said, 'tomorrow, you have to leave.'" By the time of our first visit on August 2, over 2,000 people had already been moved. Several of the tents were ripped. Others were still standing in place, emptied of the people. "But several of us have had our tents ripped up," recalled Badette. "And we have nowhere to go. We're forced to stay here. Some people just left their things because they have nowhere to go with them."



Photo: Valerie Kaussen, Soeurs Salessiens, August 2010. Resident leader's tent was ripped as intimidation / retaliation for organizing residents.

School officials had taken fingerprints and asked for copies of all official documents, asking people what amount of loan they would need to move. People became afraid that with all the official documentation they would be held legally to the loan, despite the fact that people didn't get that amount. According to Badette, the IOM was surprised to find out that people only got 2500 gourdes, about \$63, because school and NGO officials told them residents were getting much, much more. Badette summoned people who had been moved to offer proof.

Not only were Badette's efforts in vain, they met with retaliation. On Thursday, August 5, an individual known to be working with the official security guards came to Badette's tent with a knife. Badette said that he received death threats, and presumed this was an assassination attempt. Not finding Badette, the assailant ripped all the surrounding tents.

The following day, Badette went to the municipal court to offer a deposition, where the author and colleague met him. Hopefully not because of the presence of foreigners, the judge, Franz Guillou saw Badette right away, and we



Photo: Aviation, August 2010. This camp had been closed.

drove with him back to Soeurs Salessiens, where Judge Guillou assessed damage to the tent and took three people's testimony. During the 15 minutes we were there, this same assailant locked the gate, keeping us from our scheduled 11:00 appointment with Mayor Yvon Jerome and his two assistant mayors in City Hall.

There have been similar cases of forced evictions all over the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, including a well-documented case at Immaculée in Cité Soleil, in which residents worked with BAI and IAT to defend their rights. A pattern seems to have emerged in which residents are first cut off of services. Because they have nowhere to go, because housing has not been built or repaired, and because the majority of people still remaining in the camps were renters before the earthquake, many people have no choice but to remain. Human rights investigators found that – of those who still remained in July – 94% of families felt that they could not return to their homes (LAMP et al., 2010). In several cases, residents are threatened with physical violence or see their tents ripped up as a means to pressure them to leave.

The Protection cluster is either unwilling or unable to stop this wave of forced removals. "We stay way out of it," said a staff official. "We

don't want to send the message that landowners can call us when they want to take their land back." If it's a simple issue of granting the landowner access to the house to rebuild, or the road, organized efforts to negotiate seem to work, such as the case of Pivoine, near Fort-National. In other cases, the owner, including several churches that the author has heard of, residents are charged a fee in order to have the right to use the land. Some within the humanitarian community are fearful that landowners will begin demanding rent from

the government or international NGOs offering services. "It's only logical," said one. "It's their land." In one very large camp in Carrefour controlled by a religious group, residents showed the author a monthly rent for the land, which according to the church-appointed residents' committee was collected for trash cleanup and security.

Private ownership is treated as sacrosanct by the Haitian government, the international humanitarian organizations, and NGOs. Despite this, many properties have many competing land claims (Padgett and Desvarieux 2010), and BAI attorney Mario Joseph estimates that 70 percent of landowners attempting to evict people lack the proper title to the land in the first place.

While documentation is difficult to find, persistent rumors ostensibly originating from the government are that IDP camps on private land are to be closed in December in favor of the "resettlement" sites on public land, such as Co-rail, Carradeux, and Tabarre Issa.

Taken together, violence against women, theft, and the ever-present threat of forced removal looms large over the 1.3 million IDPs. What can residents – particularly camp committees – do about this situation?

## VII. CAMP COMMITTEES



Photo: Caradeux camp, July 2010. Some committees have become very powerful in the camps, monopolizing resources.

The failures in aid delivery are serious, and as such require urgent attention. As the reconstruction commission finally is moving onto the “rebuilding” phase, we need to also consider the civic infrastructure within the camps. Arguably more important than technical solutions is the need for genuine participation; time and time again, experience within development shows that without participation, even the best laid plans and most technically sophisticated projects are doomed to fail (see Easterly 2006, among very many others). Given that 1.3 million people are living in the camps, how can we evaluate participation in this context?

Again the question needs to be asked, are people simply falling through the cracks or is the foundation itself unsound?

Unfortunately the answer appears to be the latter. The current state of affairs reproduces top-down decision and communication structures, wherein the few who are connected control the resources for many. To many of the UN clusters, “NGOs are the voice of the people.” In turn, NGOs rely on camp committees to know the needs and priorities of the population within the camps.

According to the latest DTM that included this information, 95% of camps have resident committees. NGOs are officially encouraged to work with the committees, as one agency staff put it, “to check off the box for local participation.” Some NGOs give committees the power to distribute the aid, either from a belief in local empowerment or efficiency. But according to the

Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP), NGOs know very little about committees.

### Low Levels of Participation

Although to NGO and UN representatives the committees are the official “voice” of the camps, the majority of committees leave the population out of decision-making and even communication. While 77.5 percent of respondents (up to four per camp) answered that there was a committee in their camp, fewer than a third even knew the committee’s name (32.4%) or plan/strategy (31.5%). Less than half of residents knew what the committee’s activities were (46.3%) – and this affirmative response included people who replied that the committee was doing “nothing” owing to an oversight in coding.

Despite the fact that most people did not know what the committee was called, 62.8 percent of respondents could name the committee’s leader. This suggests that leaders have become visible; in the words of many, “gwo pèsonaj” (big personalities). In many cases these are pastors, judging from the titles given by respondents. Longer, in-depth, research would be useful. Two researchers suggested a form for follow up research (see Appendix); both later participated in the field testing of HAP’s “Camp Assessment Tool” (HAP 2010).

That said, just over half – 51.6 percent – of people felt they had the right to participate in the committee. Because of the lack of precision during these short interviews, “participation” could mean that people received the aid that passed through committees’ hands. This is slightly lower than responses given by committee members themselves; 50 of 88 (57%) said that people were welcome to participate in meetings. Still, according to the committee members themselves, 43 percent of camps don’t have open meetings.

Connected to this culture of closed committee meetings, perhaps more telling is the issue of communication between committees and residents. Residents of the camps are ill informed about the future, be it resettlement, future aid to be delivered, or housing. Only 106 of 328 people, or 32.3 percent – less than a third – said they were informed about the future.

### Dependency

Many commentators – both Haitian and foreign – remarked about the extraordinary degree of solidarity and unity immediately following the earthquake. Haitians’ collective ability to coordinate and share very scarce resources saved many lives. Many of these ad-hoc efforts transformed themselves into the camp committees. This is certainly the understanding of NGO and cluster employees: that the committees arose from this bottom-up process and collectivist can-do spirit.

Elisabeth Senatus, a leader within l’Étoile Brillant (Shining Star), a women’s organization that plays an active role in their camp, recalled their beginnings: “We didn’t wait for people to come give us orders. We might have potential that we weren’t aware of. We use what resources we have in hand. We didn’t wait for millions to ar-



Photo: Léogâne, July 2010. Camp women’s group partnering with MUDHA to organize income generating activities.



rive, we created. We went to an agency that works to save children, and asked for funds for education, child protection, etc. We went through the whole process but they never supported us. So we created our own space.” After several weeks of being on their own, L’Étiolle Brillant created a child-care center, school, weekly film night, weekly skits, and a bracelet-making workshop for the women in the center, with the support of MUDHA, the Association of Dominican-Haitian Women led by Sonia Pierre.

The principles of *kotizasyon* (cost-sharing, where each one contributes a small amount to a collective till) and *youn-edè-lòt* (one helping the other), both characteristic of Haiti’s rural grassroots organizations are alive and well in many spontaneously organized camp committees. In nearby CAJIT, with absolutely no money at all (recall they only received tarps in April) they operate a volunteer clinic, organize neighborhood clean-ups, and sponsor a nightly security vigil, with absolutely no outside money. For example, they pass the hat to collect funds to cook a hot meal for the male volunteers who take turns staying up all night patrolling the spread out grounds.



Photo: Valerie Kaussen, outside of Solino, March 2010. Long line of women waiting for their food distribution. Many had been waiting in line since 2 a.m.

Unfortunately these stories of self-reliance and self-help are not the norm in the officially recognized committees seven months following the earthquake. The interviews with committee members were qualitative, precluding statistical information. That said, however, a couple of disturbing trends deserve mention. The most common answer to the question – by far – about why the committee was created was some variant of the phrase to receive NGO aid. This said, the majority of committees – around 70 percent – reported not doing any activity for lack of external aid.

On top of this the NGOs are remapping Haiti’s civic infrastructure, displacing the government. Twenty-eight of 88 of camp committees say that a government representative visited (29.5%),<sup>19</sup> whereas 49 out of 87 camp committees say that they work with an NGO (56%).

### Gender Concerns

Before aid was stopped in April, many NGOs gave camp committees power to distribute ration cards. Too often, this system of cards was abused by the committee members. There have been numerous cases of men using these cards to attempt to force women recipients into having sex. KOFIV’s Eramithe Delva decried, “Why is it these hard-up guys get the cards to distribute? Now [the NGOs] are using them to distribute the cards. And they don’t give the cards to the women. So now even a young girl in need is forced to sleep with the person for a little card.”

In addition to this sexual harassment, the author visited the Solino camp the day of the last food distribution at the end of March. The cards were distributed between 11 p.m. and midnight the night before.

<sup>19</sup> To some people, DINEPA, being a new agency, was thought of as an NGO or “company.”



Photo: Carrefour, August 2010. Graffiti reads, “Down with the [aid distribution] card thieves. The thieves give cards at midnight.” The “thieves” are NGOs, committee members, or their designates. The vast majority are men.

Everyone we talked with was inside the camp because they hadn’t received a card. Nathalie, a 26 year old mother of three, said, “You can’t afford to sleep when you hear that there’s a card distribution. You never know where and when they will give it out. You just have to follow the noise of the crowd and hope you will get yours.” Sylvie, who has 14 people – including her infant daughter and her sister’s family – living in her ripped tent, said that she never got a card because she doesn’t know the NGO representatives. “It’s all about your people getting the goods,” she said.

As suggested by the story of the card distribution, men predominate in official camp committees. Out of 61 camps with sex-segregated data, there were 160 women committee members out of a total of 587, or 27%. While this number is much lower than the population within the camps, this is higher than expected, certainly higher than the percentage of women running for president of Haiti. In 10 percent of the camp committees, women comprise a majority.

## Democracy Indicators

How did people become members of committees? Official recognition came not a process of grassroots discussion but simply the appearance of an outsider – NGO, UN cluster, or Haitian government – asking who was in charge. “What were we going to do? Hold a town hall meeting? We didn’t have the time to organize meetings. It was a crisis, and time was of the essence,” said one NGO worker. The majority of committees, 59 percent, are self-selected,

according to the committee members themselves in interviews with researchers. Also according to these individuals, 2 percent were chosen by NGOs and 8 percent by someone else. Only 18 percent of committees came to power through an election process.

This clear lack of democratic structure is by itself cause for concern, especially given the elections scheduled for November and the billions of aid that is – hopefully – to arrive to rebuild Haiti. Perhaps more disturbing is that in many cases, officially recognized committees have elbowed out neighborhood groups that existed before the earthquake. This was the case in Delmas 2, in Place de la Paix. The managing NGO excluded Men Nan Men (Hand in Hand), a grassroots group with around 2,000 members and regular membership meetings, that had been working in the neighborhood since December 15, 1990, almost twenty years. Similar exclusions took place in Solino and several other camps.

In a presentation to the CCCM cluster meeting in July, HAP reported that in the camp they studied, the camp committee actively excluded other local organizations that existed before the earthquake, organized “subcommittees” to

concentrate power in their hands, failed to include the population and certainly the most vulnerable (handicapped people and women with infants), and distributed aid in a non-transparent manner, to their friends. At the cluster meeting, many NGO camp managers shared similar stories of non-accountable committees.

Many committees were created by NGOs, government, or landowners themselves. Elvire Constant recalled the top-down fashion that the central committee at St. Louis de Gonzague was formed: “On Monday or Tuesday [March 29 or 30], a representative of the government told us we need to create a central committee to make arrangements for when we all are forced out that we do so in an orderly fashion.” In addition to the top-down nature of the committee, it was formed to execute an external-driven priority of forced removal. The committee at Soeurs Salessiens in Carrefour, that is forcing residents out, was comprised of school officials themselves – the owners of the land.

According to the committee representatives who answered this question, there were conflicts in 31 of 89 camps, or 35% of cases. This statistic is high, given that it is in the interests of committees to minimize the appearances of a problem to outsiders, be they government, NGO, UN representatives or independent researchers. According to these same committee representatives themselves, the majority of these conflicts arose from problems during aid distribution (15 out of 29), with an additional third (n=9) of the conflicts arising from competition between committees.

Sometimes the conflicts result in a change in leadership. Someone in Corail told a researcher that, “We revolted against manager Richard Paul because of the bad service he gave us.” Indeed, whether or not a result of the conflict with residents, the agency that employed Paul who managed Corail replaced him with another foreigner. In one camp in Carrefour (name withheld to protect them), residents kicked out

a committee because of the former’s nepotistic delivery of aid, and formed a new committee in June. This new committee organizes weekly open town-hall meetings.

### **Differences across the Camps**

Like with the camp conditions, the governance / civic infrastructure issues vary by camp. According to a report by French NGO ActEd, 80 percent of residents are aware of the committee at Ti Savanne, compared to 34 at Tapi Rouge. 25 as compared to 6 percent were aware of the selection process, and 31 as opposed to 5 percent have regular contact with the committee.

There are also numerous stories of Herculean efforts by camp leaders to organize security brigades, neighborhood clean-up efforts, open schools, and sponsor cultural even income-generating activities such as handicrafts. For example, residents at Mausolée, across from the remains of the Palais de Justice (Justice Palace, home to the Minister of Justice and the Cour de Cessation, Haiti’s “Supreme Court”), reported no cases of rape (until August) whereas KOFAVIV reported 22 cases of rape in the first three months in nearby Place Pétion, Champs-de-Mars.

NGO-managed camps had worse governance and civil society indicators than those without. People in NGO-managed camps were slightly less informed about the name of the camp committee (27%, compared to 35%), less aware of the committee’s plan (25%, compared to 35%), and less familiar with the committee leadership (50.5%, compared to 69.0%) than those in camps not managed by NGOs. Most interestingly, only 39.8 percent of people in NGO-managed camp felt they could participate in the committee’s activities, whereas 57.5 percent of those in camps without an NGO management agency felt they could participate. The only indicator in which NGO-managed camps were better than average was informing residents about the future, 39 as opposed to 29 percent. Further, longer-term qualitative follow up re-

search is necessary, but this could suggest that in the eyes of the population, the committees are farther from them and closer to the NGOs that give out the aid. It could also suggest that NGOs that work with committees feel less of a need to include the population since they have more regular consultation – and aid – from the NGOs. Or it could simply be an issue of power corrupting.

Camps with committees in which women were the majority were more informed about the committee's name (43% compared to a 32% average), and slightly more likely to feel they can participate in the committee (60% compared to 52%), for example. They were also more likely to recognize the leader, but less likely to know the plan or activities of the committee. Whether committees are led by women

made little difference in informing residents about the future. This maybe because of the small sample: only 30 people responded to questions, from 9 camps that had majority of women on their committees. However, the fact that the most organized and active camps including CAJIT and l'Étoile Brillant are led by women, and Mausolée has near gender parity, may not be coincidental.

Size of camp does not appear to have any difference here; smaller camps are no more or less likely to inform or involve residents than large camps.<sup>20</sup> Correlations were sought under the hypothesis that smaller camps would be more grassroots, with people more likely to be informed or involved, if nothing else because of the ease of communication facilitated by the smaller size.



Photo: Valerie Kaussen, outside of Solino, March 2010. NGOs and camp committees favored a top-down, militarized, approach to aid distribution. Suddenly, general food distribution stopped altogether in April.

<sup>20</sup> An interesting finding is that camps between 400 and 1,000 families usually had the highest scores. This could be significant but no explanation suggests itself other than random chance that they were the best managed.

## VIII. FOREIGN NGOS' ROLE IN THE PROBLEMS

*"The NGO had a very negative impact in the eyes of the population because they made a lot of promises and they don't respect them."*

– resident of Corail

As noted above, HAP came to similar conclusions about the lack of participation and democracy within the camp committees (2010). When they reported on their findings at a CCCM cluster meeting in July, there was a palpable sense of relief from the NGO camp managers as they could finally discuss this issue. Heretofore NGOs had felt isolated, as if they were the only ones experiencing this problem or at least should not discuss this in public. The conversation was peppered with NGOs offering many examples of dictatorial committees. The issue was discussed among the NGOs as a problem they inherited, not as one they had anything to do with.

From the stories of solidarity and survival to the current situation of dependence and despotism, NGOs have been contributing to this problem. First and foremost, it was NGOs that empowered committees to distribute cards, often with no oversight. This is a sore spot for many camp residents who were sidelined in the aid distribution process. While it may or may not have been the case that in January, there was "no time" for general consultation and town-hall meetings, that time has certainly passed, and in Clinton's words, NGOs do not appear to be serious about "working themselves out of a job" by empowering the committees or reinforcing the government. When asked about training residents to manage the camp, one NGO worker said flatly, "it never occurred to me."

As noted above, the lack of NGO coordination has always been a problem, at least as long as there have been reports written about NGOs since the 1980s. The earthquake and the massive scale-up of aid compounded this problem. The story of Bobin wherein three NGOs began

work there and then left, without installing water, is a good case in point. The lack of coordination also explains why there are huge gaps in service across geographical areas.

To cite another example, the fewer services in Cité Soleil are also a testament to NGOs' inability to submit to the Haitian government's authority. Certain NGOs repeatedly ignore S.O.S. requests from the WASH cluster and local governments to clean the latrines, fix a broken water main, or simply install the needed services. "Literally, they refuse to clean up their shit," exclaimed an exasperated civil servant.

The experience of CAJIT and Pivoine not receiving aid suggests another explanation for the geographic differences in aid, that of focusing on appearances. Simply put, camps like the one in Champs-de-Mars and near the international airport are highly visible, and they are ringed with toilets and water, giving the appearance that people are being taken care of. Places like CAJIT and Pivoine, or others in Carrefour or Croix-des-Bouquets, are off the beaten path and much less likely to see any aid.

NGO aid tends to be delivered in a top-down fashion. When asked about how NGOs know the needs of the communities, one worker was quite blunt: "We're professionals. We know what the needs are better than them," meaning residents. Acknowledging this to be an extreme position within the humanitarian community, there is a shared belief of residents' not being trustworthy, which is in the end why people within the aid industry continually repeat that people are "only in camps to collect services." Said one, "We know they're milking the system. If I was poor, and all of a sudden all kinds of resources appear, I would do the same in their place." As a result, committees are used not so much as "voices of the people" but as instruments of the NGOs, UN, government, or landowners, to implement their aid delivery or to organize the people to leave a given camp. This

top-down orientation stems not from NGOs' malice but from their worldview – belief in humanitarianism and distrust of both the state and people “milking” the system – as well as their structural isolation. Said one, “I don't get out of my office to know what's going on.”

There is a growing popular sentiment distrustful of NGOs, alluded to by the resident of Corail. Graffiti all across the metropolitan area contains slogans such as “aba [tout] ONG” or “ONG vole” (Down with [all] NGOs / NGOs are thieves). This popular outrage comes as a surprise to many humanitarians who have come to Haiti from other countries to use their expertise in disasters such as the tsunami.

A resident in the Delmas 2 camp, frustrated by the inattention by their NGO camp management agency and service providers, voiced a commonly heard critique that NGOs profit off of this situation while doing little to actually solv-

ing the structural problems: “They have the means to help. If they don't help, NGOs wouldn't exist. It's because of these problems that they exist. If all problems were resolved there would never be NGOs.”

For those who knew Haiti before the earthquake, NGOs held an ambivalent to negative place in the minds of Haiti's poor majority who sees NGOs consume the biggest and newest cars, the biggest offices, and all the trappings of foreign modernity such as computers, internets, etc. Since the earthquake, NGOs are spending even larger sums, paying higher rents for the “green” houses and purchasing new equipment. Haiti's fleet of rental vehicles – \$200 per day for an SUV – could not keep up with the NGO and UN demand; for the first time, cars with Dominican license plates are commonplace. A widely reported figure of the \$1000 per day foreign contractor dwarfs the relatively small amount of funds ending up in the camps.



## IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

The conditions in the camps are violations of the 1.5 million IDPs' (including 200,000 living outside the camps) human rights. To address them head on, not only immediate action is needed, but so is a re-orientation of aid. Aid and reconstruction efforts should be based on a rights-based framework (see, for example, NYU School of Law Center for Human Rights and Global Justice 2008).

Now is the opportunity to rethink and retool the aid that has contributed to Haiti's extreme vulnerability while rendering Haiti poorer and more dependent. The neoliberal framework is a collusion of local elite exclusion of Haiti's poor majority and the exclusion of the Haitian state by forced privatization and a diminished social safety net.

**Recommendation #1: Donors such as the U.S. and U.N. should focus more funds and rebuilding efforts at rebuilding the capacity of the elected Haitian government, and not simply NGOs.**

The first lesson to learn from the camps is that the neoliberal attachment to NGOs must be critically rethought. As scholars of NGOs have long argued, they are not and never were the "magic bullet that can be fired in any direction and will still find its target" (Edwards and Hulme 1996:3). NGOs are just as likely to fall prey to the ills that befall elected governments: mismanagement, inefficiency, and corruption. Worse, as the experience in the camps shows, NGOs spend more money than Haiti's government and are not even juridically responsible or accountable to the local population. The patchwork of services provided and the quite significant variability derives from their structure: they are *private* and "voluntary."

It is not by coincidence that the cluster that has the most hands-on, local, empowerment-oriented approach and the most effective at attaining its results is the WASH cluster. It is

also the only one headed by a Haitian government agency.

**Recommendation #2: All NGOs working in Haiti need to work with the Haitian government and respect the local authorities.**

In addition to the WASH cluster, and one of the ingredients of its success, is an array of effective local governments, such as Carrefour's Mayor Jerome. Jerome is correctly respected among the donors for his "can-do" and hands-on approach, brokering agreements between land owners and residents; unlocking sticky land tenure issues; and making progress towards permanent housing and road reconstruction.

**Recommendation #3: All NGOs working in Haiti need to have an active and robust participation of impacted residents. This needs to specifically include regular, general, public, "town hall" meetings in the camps and other impacted communities.**

As this report demonstrates, the level of participation and even inclusion or awareness of camp residents is very low. Critically, in camps where NGOs act as camp management agencies, the democracy and civic infrastructure indices are worse than average. This fact, combined with the general trend toward greater dependence and autocratic leadership style among the committees, can only be understood as resulting from the approach of NGOs toward the camps. Whether intentionally or not, whether a result of expediency, efficiency, mistrust, or a top-down orientation, in many cases NGOs are creating the very problems that they are trying to solve with the unaccountable and autocratic committees in many of the camps.

The solution, recommended by HAP as well (2010), is to include the general population in the discussion and decision-making process.

**Recommendation #4: NGOs should specifically encourage under-represented populations, particularly women, and pre-existing grassroots groups.**

More vulnerable people, particularly women, people with disabilities, and children need to be proactively sought out, in focus groups or other formalized settings (see also HAP 2010).

Some committees, like CAJIT and l'Étoile Brillant cited above, and other groups such as Men Nan Men who are not "official" committees, already regularly involve the people. Women's groups like KOFAVIV, who has an array of 33 community agents scattered across many camps, and FAVILEK, involved in Mausolée, have been effective at supporting victims and preventing violence against women. Steps should be taken to encourage their participation, given constraints of these groups.

This begs the question about how to tell 'good' committees from 'bad' committees.

**Recommendation #5: NGOs should assess the official committees and support those who are doing well in transitioning toward greater autonomy, offer training to mid-range groups, and engage lower-functioning groups in dialogue with the general population.**

HAP offers a workable plan for camp committee assessment (2010) which offers a wealth of qualitative information by which NGO camp managers and service providers can craft informed strategies about approaching committees.

Lambi Fund offers another approach, one adapted by the author for the present study. Before even engaging a peasants' association and offering an application for funding, Lambi field agents trained in community organizing visit the community. They ask people not involved in the project their esteem of the association, and their ideas about priorities for the community. At a larger community meeting,

organizers are not allowed to speak in order to facilitate ordinary members' and residents' speaking about the projects and its merits, as well as the organization.

A similar approach was conducted by the Haiti Response Coalition, employing nine trained *animatè* – "animators" or community organizers – to work to provide aid in 40 camps, using this bottom-up, participatory approach.

Researchers noted the following guide for assessing camp committees, used in their rankings after visiting 12-20 camps:

- 1) The appearance of the camp – is it organized and well-maintained? Is trash picked up? Are the water and other WASH facilities well organized and maintained?
- 2) The esteem of the committee and its leadership from the general population: are they generally known and well thought of by ordinary people in a surprise visit?
- 3) Does the committee engage in activities (e.g., cultural programming, security patrol, cleanup) using their own means, or are they waiting for NGO aid?
- 4) Are there full community meetings – *tèt ansanm* ("town hall") – announced in advance or regular? Does a wide cross-section of people attend and actively participate?
- 5) Are regular meetings held as they should, on time, and are decisions communicated in culturally appropriate manner to the entire population?

Committees that are well-organized using the above criteria deserve even greater support, to attain greater autonomy and self-sufficiency. These groups should be in direct contact with the elected governments – local and national – as well as the NGOs and donors offering aid.

Organizing communities does take time, training, and experience, particularly learning from



mistakes and open communication. International NGOs like HAP and the Sphere project, and local institutions like Lambi Fund or the Coalition could be useful in providing this training and support for NGOs and the camp committees.

See HAP 2010 for ideas about how to address low-functioning and autocratic committees, also listed in the appendix.

**Recommendation #6: Provide support for education at all levels, including popular education about IDP rights.**

Haiti will need a generation of educated, active citizens involved in this long-term reconstruction. Especially since it is currently unfeasible for many camp residents to attend schools because of the additional time and expense to attend schools – in addition to security concerns – residents need to be given tools to organize high-quality education at all levels inside or very near the camps. This specifically includes IDPs’ rights to life-saving services and permanent housing. Groups like the Inivèsite Popilè (Popular University) and FRAKKA (the Reflection and Action Force on Housing) are engaging their neighbors in the camps for education and mobilization campaigns. NGOs and their affiliated top-down camp committees often feel threatened by them and by the prospect of people knowing their rights. “Why would we do that? That would just make our jobs more difficult,” said an NGO employee.

Every country needs the active and free participation of its citizens, who are empowered because of knowledge of their rights. This is especially true in Haiti following the earthquake. The



Photo: August 2010. Mobilization of diverse groups for the rights of IDP people, particularly to force the government to step up construction of permanent housing as a right.

rebuilding will take years. The current clientelistic system is a bad omen for the upcoming election, particularly following the exclusion of many political parties, including that of former President Aristide, which has a strong base of Haiti’s poor majority.

**Recommendation #7: Provide more security, especially for women, including an indefinite end to forced evictions until sufficient numbers of quality permanent housing is available.**

See IJDH and MADRE’s report (2010) listing particular issues to stop the rise of gender-based violence (recommendations in the appendix). In addition offering more resources to the volunteer brigades spontaneously organized by camp committees or women’s groups, more culturally-sensitive patrols need to be conducted. Investigations need to be followed up on more quickly with solutions quickly implemented.

The biggest insecurity faced by many is the ever-present threat of forced expulsion. IDPs have

rights to life-saving services, many of which are being prevented because of private landowners' unwillingness. Particularly given the uncertainty about landowners' claims to the land, eminent domain should be used to grant the 1.3 million camp residents some sense of security in the short term as long-term solutions are quickly underway. The state has the right to declare private property for social and housing purposes under the 8th of July 1921 Decree on the Recognition of Public Interest.

**Recommendation #8: Provide services in the neighborhoods as well as the camps.**

Given the persistent, and lethal, refrain that people are swelling the camps in order to receive aid, most critically water, punishing people who have nowhere else to go by withholding the services is both morally reprehensible and a violation of IDPs' human rights.

Especially if this is true in a minority of cases, the more humane, just solution would be to provide these life-saving services to communities outside *in addition to* the camps. This might well be an incentive to encourage more people to move into permanent housing.

**Recommendation #9: All parties: the Haitian government, NGOs, and donors, need to make the expedient construction of high-quality permanent housing its first priority.**

Especially as they are being starved by the private landowners and NGOs alike from necessary services, increasingly people remain in IDP camps because they have nowhere else to go. Closing camps may be thought of as a "success" for policymakers and donors but this merely means that people are forced to once again relocate, moving farther away from their social network, economic opportunities, support systems, and children's schools. The author has spoken with several people who were living in their third or fourth IDP camp as of mid-August, only seven months following the earthquake.

These human beings are being re-traumatized as they have to make their way attempting to move into yet another camp living with strangers and a greater insecurity. As KOFAVIV's Malya Villard noted, this takes a greater toll on women:

That affects women more because you know, normally, women are always more affected by difficult situations. Because it's women who have to take care of children. It's women who have to go out in the streets and look for a livelihood to give their children food. It affects women when the government or anyone else forces a woman to leave the camp to go somewhere else, with a lot of children in her hands without knowing where she will go.

There are indeed several obstacles getting in the way of rebuilding housing, including rubble removal – an estimated 98 percent of the rubble remains.

For individuals who do have relatively secure land title and a house that can be rebuilt or repaired, the most just and expedient solution is to subsidize individual families to clear the rubble and make their own repairs. One NGO is attempting this to facilitate the closure of a 50-family camp. This is too new to be evaluated, but this grassroots approach should be explored more often and fully supported.

**Recommendation #10: Fully fund Haitian relief efforts.**

Progress on ALL of the above is stymied by the slow delivery on promised aid.

In a September 28 AP article, Jonathan Katz cited that only 15 percent of promised funds have been released (2010b). Disturbingly, NONE of the promised 1.15 billion in aid from the U.S. has materialized. According to Katz, Senator Tom Coburn has blocked its passage in the Foreign Relations Committee because of a \$5 mil-

lion line-item that appears to duplicate the structure of the U.S. Ambassador in Haiti (ibid.). Quick action must be taken to rectify this while Congress is still in session, before they break for mid-term elections.

The voting public must seize this opportunity of increased visibility during election season to push the passage of this 1.15 billion in aid. As this report and very many others like it amply document, the crisis is far from over and the situation remains quite urgent. We should follow up our unprecedented generosity by keeping our promises to our long-standing neighbor.

It is not too late to rebuild, but we need to rebuild on solid foundations. It is possible if we act now. Our conscience should allow no less.

### Other recommendations

Interestingly several reports, from many perspectives, have reached similar conclusions. The author encourages people to read “From Disaster Aid to Solidarity” (Bell 2010a), “We Are Still Trembling” (Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, et al. 2010), “We Became Garbage to Them” (International Action Ties 2010b), “Camp Committee Assessment Tool” (Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2010), and “We Have Been Forgotten” (The LAMP for Haiti Foundation, et al. 2010). Given the similarity of the recommendations found in these texts to one another and to those included in this report, a list of recommendations is provided in the annex.



Photo: August 2010. Grassroots women’s group KOFAVIV has been active in defending the rights of women, protecting victims of violence, and engaged in advocacy efforts, here participating in a coalition sit-in seven months after the earthquake.

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## **XI. APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX 1: SPHERE PROJECT MINIMUM STANDARDS**

#### **Common Standard 1: Participation**

The disaster-affected population actively participates in the assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the assistance program

- Women and men of all ages from the disaster-affected and wider local populations, including vulnerable groups, receive information about the assistance program, and are given the opportunity to comment to the assistance agency during all stages of the project cycle.
- Written assistance program objectives and plans should reflect the needs, concerns, and values of the disaster-affected people, particularly those belonging to vulnerable groups, and contribute to their protection
- Programming is designed to maximize the use of local skills and capacity.

#### **Water supply standard 1: access and water quantity**

All people have safe and equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water for drinking, cooking, and personal and domestic hygiene. Public water points are sufficiently close to households to enable use of the minimum water requirement.

- Average water use for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene in any household is at least 15 liters per person per day
- Maximum distance from any household to the nearest water point is 500 meters
- Queuing time at a water source is no more than 15 minutes
- Water sources and system are maintained such that appropriate quantities of water are available consistently or on a regular basis

#### **Excreta disposal standard 1: access to, and numbers of, toilets**

People have adequate numbers of toilets, sufficiently close to their dwellings, to allow them rapid, safe, and acceptable access at all times of the day and night

- A maximum of 20 people use each toilet
- Use of toilets is arranged by households and/or segregated by sex
- Separate toilets for women and men are available in public places
- Shared or public toilets are cleaned and maintained in such a way that they are used by all intended users
- Toilets are no more than 50 meters from dwellings

#### **Solid waste management standard 1: collection and disposal**

People have an environment that is acceptably uncontaminated by solid waste, including medical waste, and have the means to dispose of their domestic waste conveniently and effectively.

- People from the affected population are involved the design and implementation of the program
- All households have access to a refuse container and/or are no more than 100 meters from a communal refuse pit
- At least one 100-liter refuse container is available per 10 families, where domestic refuse is not buried on site

## APPENDIX 2 – SURVEY

### Kan an / sit la:

Non

Kote li twouve l

Mèt tè a

Kous machin pou rive lavil:

konbyen goud:

konbyen minit:

### Kondisyon nan kan:

Deskripsyon zòn nan (mache, biwo, lekòl, sèvis sosyal, ets)

Deskripsyon fizik/anviwonman (dimansyon, pyebwa, lonbray, labou, pousyè, wòch, ets) *kaye*

# tant – deskripsyon/kondisyon (egz. konbyen ki chire)

# prela

# fanmi

# moun

Sistèm pou dlo

Kapasite

Chak kilè li ranpli

Pa kiyès

Kapab bwe

Kijan li jere

Pa kiyès

# twalèt

mobil

latrin

ijenik

Eta latrin

Chak kilè li netwaye

Pa kiyès

Sant sante nan kan WI / NON

Kiyès ki disponib (doktè, enfimyè, ajan sante)

Anplwaye oubyen volontè

Ki sèvis yo bay

Si pa gen sant, konbyen minit mache pou rive la

Famasi nan kan WI / NON

Osonon, konbyen minit mache pou rive la

Eske yo bay medikaman

Lòt sèvis:

Gen lekòl pou timoun WI / NON deskripsyon:

Gen kantin pou moun manje WI / NON deskripsyon:

Gen sant pou timoun kap jwe WI / NON deskripsyon:

Gen sant 'psycho-social'	WI / NON	deskripsyon:
Gen kote granmoun kap reyini	WI / NON	deskripsyon:
Gen kote ki gen kouran	WI / NON	deskripsyon:
Televizyon	WI / NON	deskripsyon:
Akse imel	WI / NON	deskripsyon:
Chaje selilè	WI / NON	deskripsyon:

Ki aktivite kap fèt nan kan

Lòt sèvis

Kondisyon sekirite nan kan an

Kijan sekirite nan kan an yè  
Kiyès ki anchaje sa a

Komite 1:

Non / sig  
Reskonsab  
Kowòdone

Komite 2:

Non / sig  
Reskonsab  
Kowòdone

Komite 3:

Non / sig  
Reskonsab  
Kowòdone

Kalite èd kan an resevwa:

Kisa  
Chak kilè li vini  
Denye fwa li vini  
Kote li soti  
Reskonsab  
Kontak ONG

*BAY KONSTA PA W - parapò ak lòt kan, sak pi byen, sak pi mal? Sak frape ou pi plis?*

*Ann global, bay yon chif kondisyon kan an: 1 (li nòmal) rive 10 (pi move kondisyon ou ka imajine)*



**Nivo konesans moun sou komite / èd. # 1 – Fi / gason laj – pi piti 25 an**

**25-40 an plis pase 40**

Ki kote ou te yè avan

Èske gen komite WI/ NON

Kijan li rele

Ki plan yo genyen

Ki aktivite yo mete sou pye

Kiyès ki responsab

Èske nou gen dwa patisipe ladan l WI/ NON

Gen yon ONG ki ede nou la WI/ NON si wi, non ONG

Èske gen èd ki konn vini WI/ NON si wi, ki èd

Ki denye fwa èd la te vini Jan Fev Mas Avr Mè Jen Jiye

Ki chanjman te fèt nan kan an (nan denye mwa yo)?

Ki pi gwo pwoblèm

Ki priyorite pou amelyore lavi isit

Èske yo pale sou lavni (zafè kay, anlèvman, ets)

**Nivo konesans moun sou komite / èd. # 2 – Fi / gason laj – pi piti 25 an 25-40 an plis pase 40**

Ki kote ou te yè avan

Èske gen komite WI/ NON

Kijan li rele

Ki plan yo genyen

Ki aktivite yo mete sou pye

Kiyès ki responsab

Èske nou gen dwa patisipe ladan l WI/ NON

Gen yon ONG ki ede nou la WI/ NON si wi, non ONG

Èske gen èd ki konn vini WI/ NON si wi, ki èd

Ki denye fwa èd la te vini Jan Fev Mas Avr Mè Jen Jiye

Ki chanjman te fèt nan kan an (nan denye mwa yo)?

Ki pi gwo pwoblèm

Ki priyorite pou amelyore lavi isit

Èske yo pale sou lavni (zafè kay, anlèvman, ets)

**Nivo konesans moun sou komite / èd. # 3 – Fi / gason laj – pipiti 25 an25-40 an plis pase 40**

Ki kote ou te yè avan

Èske gen komite WI/ NON

Kijan li rele

Ki plan yo genyen

Ki aktivite yo mete sou pye

Kiyès ki reskonsab

Èske nou gen dwa patisipe ladan l WI/ NON

Gen yon ONG ki ede nou la WI/ NON si wi, non ONG

Èske gen èd ki konn vini WI/ NON si wi, ki èd

Ki denye fwa èd la te vini Jan Fev Mas Avr Mè Jen Jiye

Ki chanjman te fèt nan kan an (nan denye mwa yo)?

Ki pi gwo pwoblèm

Ki priyorite pou amelyore lavi isit

Èske yo pale sou lavni (zafè kay, anlèvman, ets)

**Nivo konesans moun sou komite / èd. # 4 – Fi / gason laj – pipiti 25 an25-40 an plis pase 40**

Ki kote ou te yè avan

Èske gen komite WI/ NON

Kijan li rele

Ki plan yo genyen

Ki aktivite yo mete sou pye

Kiyès ki reskonsab

Èske nou gen dwa patisipe ladan l WI/ NON

Gen yon ONG ki ede nou la WI/ NON si wi, non ONG

Èske gen èd ki konn vini WI/ NON si wi, ki èd

Ki denye fwa èd la te vini Jan Fev Mas Avr Mè Jen Jiye

Ki chanjman te fèt nan kan an (nan denye mwa yo)?

Ki pi gwo pwoblèm

Ki priyorite pou amelyore lavi isit

Èske yo pale sou lavni (zafè kay, anlèvman, ets)

**Entèvyou ak komite a:**

Ki jan komite a rele/ sig  
Ki lè li te fonde  
Kiyès ki te kreye l  
Poukisa  
Misyon komite a

Kisa nap fè

# manm ( fanm/ gason)                      # moun nan direksyon ( fanm/ gason)  
Kòman yo chwazi yon moun pou fè pati komite a  
Ki aktivite nou mete sou pye

Chak kilè nou reyini  
Èske tout moun gen dwa vin nan rankont  
Kijan nou pran desizyon yo

Kijan nou priyore bezwen yo

Kijan nou priyore moun pou n bay èd

Kijan nou mobilize popilasyon an

Kijan popilasyon an patisipe nan aktivite komite a ap mennen

Ki denye fwa nou fè distribisyon èd  
Ki ONG kap sipòte nou  
Ki relasyon ou genyen ak ONG (yo)?

Eske yon reprezantan gouvènman konn vini? Kilès?  
Ki relasyon ou genyen ak gouvènman an?

Kote nap jwenn sipò pou fè aktivite nou

Kisa nou fè avèk patnè ONG nou

Ki aktivite nou mete sou pye avèk pwòp resous/mwayen pa nou

Ki chanjman te fèt nan denye mwa sa yo

Ki enpak ONG a genyen nan kan an apre sis mwa

Kòman nou òganize zafè sekirite nan kan an

Èske gen konfli                      WI / NON                      sou kisa

Lè gen konfli (tankou batay), kisa nou fè pou rezoud li

Èske gen lòt asosyasyon / komite nan kan? WI / NON      Konbyen  
Kijan yo rele  
Konbyen asosyasyon te egziste avan 12 janvye  
Ki relasyon ou gen ak lòt asosyasyon yo

Konbyen moun nan kan ap travay

### APPENDIX 3: EVALUATION OF CAMP COMMITTEE

Kritè	eksplikasyon	tyeke wi oswa non
Temwayaj	Li fasil pou jwenn temwayaj sou yon komite kan: ou ka bese achte epi ou pwofite mande epi ou ouvri yon dyalòg sou kan. Ou ka konplimante bèl travay ou wè, konsa nenpòt moun ka kore w osnon pa dakò. Ak lòt ankò	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>
Jesyon kan an	Nan jesyon kan an ou ka jwenn yon bann bagay: pwòpte, dlo, twalèt, sekirite... menm si pafwa se moun nan kan an ONG peye pou asire travay sa yo dirèkteman, men tou nou konnen ONG a konn pase pa Komite a pou fè travay sa yo. Oson si komite kan pa ta jwenn kalite èd sa yo nan men ONG li ta dwe aranje li yon jan kan menm pou satisfè pou pi piti youn nan bezwen sa yo ak pwòp ti mwayen pa li.	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>
Patisipasyon/ Enplikasyon nan sa k ap fèt	Ou ka kesyone moun nan kan yo sou sa yo konnen de komite a: objektif, pwojè, reyalizasyon komite a. li ta enpòtan anpil pou ta verifye si moun yo konnen non lidè a, konsa si yo pa konnen li sa ka vle di lidè a pa fè enpak. Nan sans sa a prezans fanm yo enpòtan nan komite paske fanm yo plis nan kan yo.	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>
Nivo konesans sou moun ki vilnerab yo	pwen sa a mete an valè moun ki andikape, granmoun, fanm ansent ak ti bebe ki ap nan kan an, yon komite serye ta dwe gen konesans de moun sa yo nan lide pou ba yo privilèj yo ka ba yo lè gen distribisyon ak lòt bagay.	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>
Reyalizasyon	Pwen sa a bay anpil enpotans ak kapital moun osnon imen paske avek moun nou ka fè anpil ti bagay. Nan sans sa a n ap chache konnen kisa komite yo reyalize ak pwòp ti mwayen pa yo nan kad ede yo bezwen ede, konsa menm si yon komite pa ta janm jwenn èd, si li dinamik li dwe gen nan istwa li menm se yon grenn bagay pou pi piti.	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>
Kan tout bon	Sa vle di kan kote moun viv tout bon vre, pou se pa yon kan moun fè pou blofe ONG. epi nou ta dwe verifye si gen moun k ap viv nan kan an tout bon vre.	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>
Vizit sipriz	Sa a gen rapò ak yon vizit nan kan an pou verifye si efektivman gen reyinyon ki konn fèt, paske tout komite toujou bay jou ak lè yo reyini. Konsa nou ta dwe bay yon vizit sipriz nan lide pou n wè si se yon komite ki aktif epi byen òganize.	Wi <input type="checkbox"/> non <input type="checkbox"/>

Si gen 3 nan 7 kritè sa yo ki respekte nou ka di komite sa a pa byen òganize.

Si ta gen 4 nan 7 kritè yo ki respekte nou ka di komite sa a byen òganize.  
Si ta gen 5 nan 7 kritè yo ki respekte nou ka komite sa a trè byen òganize.  
Si ta gen 6 nan 7 kritè yo ki respekte nou ka di òganizasyon komite sa a ekselan.  
Si 7 sou 7 kritè yo ta respekte nou ka di òganizasyon komite sa a pafè.

## APPENDIX 4: RECOMMENDATIONS COMING FROM OTHER REPORTS

### Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, MADRE, et. al. “Our Bodies Are Still Trembling” (July)

1. Immediately provide for increased security and lighting in the camps;
2. Invite the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women to visit Haiti;
3. Guarantee women’s full participation and leadership in all phases of the reconstruction of Haiti as mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and other internationally recognized standards;
4. In collaboration with civil society organizations, enact a systematic collection of data that documents the prevalence and incidence of all forms of violence against women in the IDP camps;
5. Act with due diligence to prevent, investigate and punish acts of violence and promote the full protection and promotion of women’s human rights.

### International Action Ties, “We Became Garbage to Them” (August 14)

#### **Proactive intervention to stop expulsions through:**

- An immediate moratorium on expulsions called for by the Haitian Government
- Fulfillment of UN mandate on protection of the human rights of civilians.
- Encourage international NGOs to prioritize vulnerable communities and their basic needs over the requests of landowners, and to allocate resources to negotiate a stop to expulsions where they are threatened

#### **Pursue sustainable solutions to land and resettlement issues through:**

- Endorsing rapid land acquisition for camps and resettlement
- Encouraging the provision of affordable housing, accessible to the poorest
- Insisting on the provision of a minimum level of free services addressing the basic needs of the internally displaced
- Consulting civil society groups and camp communities to assure community directed processes in achieving all of the above

### Humanitarian Accountability Project, “Camp Assessment Tool” (September)

1. Build direct contact and collaboration between the NGO and wider camp population, in addition to contact via the committee
2. Establish on-going monitoring of the camp committees as part of project monitoring
3. Clarify roles, responsibilities and code of conduct of the committee
4. Clearly communicate the roles and responsibilities of the committee to the camp population
5. Establish a complaints and response mechanism
6. Develop guidelines for staff on how to work with committee(s)

### LAMP, IJDH et. al, “We Have Been Forgotten” (September 20)

1. Quickly disburse aid necessary to achieve and maintain a life of basic dignity
2. Follow the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
3. Promote participation from camp residents in needs assessment and aid distribution
4. Require that donors be accountable to aid recipients
5. Coordinate with the Government of Haiti
6. Encourage self-sufficiency through employment opportunities
7. Source food aid locally to support local economy
8. Improve and expand provision of sturdy, safe shelter for camp residents
9. End the policy and practice of forced eviction

## **APPENDIX 5: RESEARCH TEAM**

### **Research Director:**

Mark Schuller, Assistant Professor, York College, City University of New York  
Affiliated Researcher and Professor, Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti

### **Researchers:**

Jean Dider Deslorges, Finissant, Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti  
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Castelot Val, Finissant, Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti  
Jude Wesh, Finissant, Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti

### **Analysis:**

Tania Levey, York College, City University of New York  
Mark Schuller, York College, City University of New York / Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti  
Chevalier Smail, Faculté d'Ethnologie, Université d'État d'Haïti

### **About the Author:**

Mark Schuller is Assistant Professor of African American Studies and Anthropology at York College (CUNY). In addition to understanding contemporary Haiti, Schuller's research contributes to globalization, NGOs, civil society, and development. Schuller has published a half-dozen peer-reviewed articles and a couple book chapters about Haiti in addition to several articles in public media including *Counterpunch*, *Common Dreams*, and the *Center for International Policy* and media interviews, including *Democracy Now!* He co-edited *Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neoliberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction* (2008, Alta Mira) and *Homing Devices: the Poor as Targets of Public Housing Policy and Practice* (2006, Lexington). Schuller is also co-producer and co-director of documentary *Poto Mitan: Haitian Women, Pillars of the Global Economy* (2009, Documentary Educational Resources). He chairs the Society for Applied Anthropology's Human Rights and Social Justice Committee and is active in a range of grassroots efforts, including earthquake relief.

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